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UNCLASSIFIED

12 December 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Report of Operations in North Africa

1. The attached is an individual report of the operations in North Africa. The facts included herein and the deductions and recommendations made are the result of personal observation in the particular sector in which I landed (Fedalah-Casablanca), plus conferences with the commanders in charge of the operations at Safi and Lyautey.

2. The general plan of the operation clicked throughout and was executed according to plan and with dispatch. However, as in any operation, the general mosaic is made up of a great many small pictures, many of which are not pretty and were not made or carried out according to the plan. This will always happen in war; but from these errors much valuable information can be obtained and an effort made to correct them in future operations. In any event, the attack was a success.

*Arthur R. Wilson*

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA.

Incls.

Report of Operations

UNCLASSIFIED

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by authority of AF of S, G-2, WDGS  
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REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA

General Plan

The general mission of the Western Task Force was to make a surprise landing on the west coast of Africa from Safi to Port Lyautey, both inclusive, at H Hour D Day (D Day being Nov. 8). The landing teams were organized in accordance with the plans of the commanders.

Resume of Plan of Operations

A. Fedalah and Casablanca.

(1) The Plan

(a) 7th Infantry. According to the plan, Landing Teams 1 and 2 (that is, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 7th Infantry, reinforced) were to land at H hour on beaches Red 2 and 3 respectively, just east of the town of Fedalah. This beach is a sandy open beach, reaching from the sea jetty on the west to a rocky cape on the east, and is about one mile in length. After landing, the 1st Battalion was to clear out any small arms fire at the beach, then make a turn to the right, clear out the town of Fedalah and capture Point Fedalah on which is located the oil tanks, installations, docks, a four gun battery of 90 mm guns, and a two gun 75 mm. battery. Landing Team No. 2 was to move inland a mile or so, swing to the southwest and capture anything on the east bank of the Oued Mellah. These two teams were to be assisted by the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop and L Company of the 7th Infantry. The Reconnaissance Troop was to land at H hour on Yellow Beach 2, west of Fedalah, attack the Point of Fedalah from the west, and seize from the west the bridge over the Oued Mellah which is on the main highway between Fedalah and Casablanca. This Reconnaissance Troop was to be taken near the shore in boats equipped with motor silencers, the landing parties to paddle ashore in rubber boats. L Company of the 7th Infantry was to land on the same beach at H + 60 and assist the Reconnaissance Troop in the final capture of the batteries. The 3rd L.T. (less Co. L) was to land on Red beach 2 at H + 70

(b) 30th Infantry. Landing teams 1 and 2 of the 30th Infantry were to land on beaches Blue 1 and Blue 2 respectively at H hour; L.T. 1 advancing straight inland as rapidly as possible to seize the high ground about five miles inland. L.T. 2 was to capture the coast defenses at Point Blondin and the highway and railroad bridges over the Oued Nefifikh. Company L of the 30th Infantry was to land at H hour at Beach Blue 3 which is about two miles northeast of the mouth of the river, swing to the southwest, and assist the L.T. 2 in its mission. L.T. 3, the 3rd battalion, less Co. L, of this regiment, was in reserve and was to land on Red 3 at H + 90.

(c) 15th Infantry. The 15th Infantry, the 1st Bn. L.T. of the 67th Armored Regt. and the 2nd battalion of the 20th Engineers, were in

floating division reserve, with instructions to land on the red beaches upon call of the division commander.

(2) Narrative of the Execution of Plan.

On the way over a special message was received from General Eisenhower to the effect that every effort was to be made to effect a peaceful landing and that a general offensive was not to be started as a result of some isolated hostile act on the part of an irresponsible unit. "We particularly desire to avoid heavy offensive action against Casablanca", he said. It was left to the various senior commanders in the three sub-task forces of the Western Task Force to give the order for a general offensive if he thought that such action was essential to the security of his force or the success of the operation.

While screening the movement of the transports into the transport area for the attack, a destroyer discovered four French merchant ships escorted by one Corvette. He signalled the ships to stop and be boarded for inspection. The skipper answered that he had orders to safeguard the ships from Dakar to Marseilles and refused to stop. The destroyer fired on them and beached all of the ships.

The first announcement that we were attacking the west coast of Africa came in a broadcast from Washington about 11:45 P.M. D-1 day while we were still in the transport area and before any boats had been launched from the ships. The announcer (from England) stated that a re-broadcast of the announcement would be made at 2:45 A.M. 8 Nov. The printed announcement made at once on the Biddle is as follows:

"UNDATED: FLASH....FLASH....FLASH....FLASH....FLASH....FLASH...."

"The London Radio announced tonight that American troops were landing on the West Coast of Africa. The announcement stated that these forces would be under the command of General Eisenhower, who has, for some time, been in command of American forces in Europe. Obviously a beamed program to French West Africa, the announcement, made to the French people, stated that the American forces were landing there to help them and not to harm them. The announcement also quoted President Roosevelt as saying that he would like to see our Flag flying next to their's and a searchlight pointed to the sky."

Because of the failure of the transports to arrive in the transport area on time, H hour was first set back to 4:30 A.M. then to 4:45 a.m. Boats began to go over the side about 1 A.M. on some ships, later on others. Some officers, to whom I talked, stated that the boat crews on the ships were inexperienced in getting the boats over the

side and that the men had difficulty going over the side and in getting into the boats because of inexperience. The boat crews on the ship which I was on (The Biddle) were well trained and the sailors handled the winches and the lowering of the craft in a silent expert manner without lights. When it was necessary to use a light to temporarily fix machinery, it was done so as to guard the light from the shore. The Biddle had been used as a training ship for the 9th Division in its exercises in Chesapeake Bay and as a result its crew probably received more training than the average on the other ships.

However, great confusion was caused by the manner in which the convoy arrived in the transport area, with the result that many boats could not locate the ships to which assigned; and where boats from one ship were scheduled to go to another for initial combat loads, many arrived late or did not arrive at all at their destinations. It is believed this resulted from the following sequence of events: All the way over the convoy traveled in formation. For example, in one column from head to rear were the following ships: The Thomas Jefferson, W. P. Biddle, Tasker Bliss, E. C. Stanton, aircraft carrier. On the right of the Biddle was the Procyon, on the left the Oberon. The soldiers and the sailors who manned the small boats were used to that formation; they looked at it day and night; they grew to know the ships by their peculiar markings by day and by their silhouettes at night. The small boat men and these soldiers on the Biddle, for example, knew that the Thomas Jefferson was ahead and the Bliss behind and they knew the ships on their flanks.

On the afternoon of D-2 and the forenoon of D-1 the convoy had feinted toward Dakar; then in the afternoon of D-1 moved toward Gibraltar. At dark it turned south toward the points of debarkation and broke into three elements. The Augusta (the flagship) had been in command of the entire convoy and when the convoy broke into three sub-task forces, the command of the center task force passed to the Captain (Emmett) on the Leonard Wood, who, incidentally, was junior to the division commander of the 3rd Division on the same ship. Operation plan 32-42 stated that "ships must be closed up and in position upon arrival at Debarkation Points".

For some inexplicable reason, instead of heading into the transport area in the same formation in which we had traveled for 14 days, two right obliques of about 45 degrees each were given. Then the ships were stopped dead in the water. The result was that in many instances, where boats from one ship were assigned to take combat loads from another ship, the coxwains couldn't find the ships where they were supposed to get their loads. Where troops were loading on boats which were part of the equipment of the particular ship they had traveled on, they were coordinated at the start, but where boats were sent from one ship to get troops on another ship for the first wave, there was great confusion. Boat crews were drifting aimlessly from transport to transport and

Megaphoning, "Is this the Ancon", "Is this the Leonard Wood", "Where is the Bliss?" Even the navigator on the Biddle was unable to locate the Bliss, which was entirely out of position. Signal lights flashed.

It would have been a field day for small torpedo motor boats with daring crews to come in on the transport area and launch torpedoes. It would have been difficult to distinguish between enemy and friendly boats. The sea was as calm as a millpond and for a while there was considerable starlight, but later thunderheads in the distance with occasional lightning flashes lit up the transport area. The ships were not anchored, but there was little drift. The surf on the beaches was negligible, probably about two feet. A few days later an elderly Frenchman, who had charge of the Port of Fedalah, told me that it was the calmest day that he could remember in 68 years. All of the elements were in our favor on a beach which many military critics held it was impossible to land on at that time of the year.

On going into the transport area, the lighthouses at both Fedalah and Casablanca were on and the lights of the cities could be plainly seen. The same condition existed, according to reports, at the other two sub-task landing points; the lights didn't go out until after the broadcast announcing that an attack was being made. Because of faulty navigation, many boats landed miles from their assigned beaches. Some which were supposed to land directly at Fedalah, landed 12 miles east, and one group of four boats, on which was Captain Sutton with a military police detachment from the Biddle, went into Casablanca harbor, ran into a French destroyer and many, including Capt. Sutton, were killed, one boat getting away with a few survivors. Other boats headed for Casablanca, but discovered their error because of the difference in the size of the lighthouses at Casablanca and Fedalah, returned to the transport area, and took another start. All this resulted in loss of time and loss of landing troops at the correct places.

L.T. 1 of the 7th Infantry began landing on Red 3 (instead of Red 2 as planned) at about 5 A.M. Some boats were lost on the reefs which separated beaches Red 2 and 3. Shortly after the landing began, enemy searchlights were directed on the beach. A patrol boat shot out the searchlights with 50 caliber guns. Shortly after daylight, artillery fire from the batteries at Point Blondin and Point Fedalah began to fall on the beaches, and also some machine gun fire. L.T. 1 (7th) landed all of its elements and took its objectives. It was opposed in the immediate front by about one company of Senagalese soldiers, poorly equipped, and after a very few rounds they surrendered.

Company A of the 7th Infantry captured the Miramar Hotel in Fedalah at 6:30 A.M. on D Day with nine members of the German Armistice Commission and a great mass of documents and data. This information included up-to-date troop positions of every French unit in Morocco;

and a rapid examination of the material indicated that a great amount of work had been done by the German Armistice Commission which will be of great value to the SOS organization in Morocco. For example, they had complete data on all railroads, spur capacities, the results of reconnaissance of all warehouses and buildings with cubic capacities for storing war materials, complete personal description of all French officers and their attitude toward the German government. As a matter of fact, Hitler's mission has saved the American Army a great deal of work.

L.T. 2 (7th) landed on Blue Beach 3 instead of Red 3 (on beaches and reefs about five miles northeast of Fedalah). Having been landed at the wrong place the battalion assisted L.T. 2 (30th) which was making good progress in the capture of Point Blandon. L.T. 2 (7th) then proceeded to its objective which it reached about 2 P.M. L.T. 1 (7th) proceeded through the town of Fedalah and endeavored to outflank the battery of two 75 mm. guns which was firing effectively on the red beaches. The 90 mm. battery had been put out of action by our destroyers but all of the naval gun fire seemed to be unable to effectively silence the two 75 mm. guns. On the way through the town a number of casualties to one company of the 1st Battalion 7th was caused by our naval gun fire.

The personnel of the 90 mm. battery surrendered to the 1st Battalion 7th Infantry and a company of the 7th Infantry finally captured the two gun battery which was still able to fire in spite of the series of bombardments from destroyers and cruisers which it went through. The two landing teams of the 30th Infantry were put ashore in five waves on their proper beaches although some of the boats crashed on the adjacent rocks and reefs. L.T. 2 landed at the mouth of the Wadi Nefifikh in daylight because of delay in boats beaching, proceeded to the capture of Point Blondin (assisted toward the end of the action by L.T. 2 (7th). All of the objectives of this regiment were captured early in the day and by night the regiment had dug in on the hills east of that point. (Five of the casualties were from naval gun fire).

North and east of Oued Nefifikh, enemy light tanks numbering approximately 20 strove throughout the action to penetrate defenses of RLG 30 without success. These were obsolete Renault tanks, some of which were destroyed and some captured. It is also known that enemy reinforcements were on their way from Marrakech when the action ceased.

The 15th Infantry was ordered ashore about 11 A.M. About 4 P.M. General Patton ordered that all Infantry and Engineers be put ashore that night. The major elements of the 7th and 30th L.T.'s were ashore by noon on D day. During the day the beaches were subjected to intermittent artillery fire until about 9 A.M. and from then on to periodic strafing and bombing attacks by French planes based on the Casablanca airfield. The road from Waddi Nefifikh to Fedalah was also strafed. It was stated that one ineffectual attempt was made to bomb the transport area, but that fighter planes from the carrier drove them off. (This is unconfirmed. I found no one who saw any of our fighter planes fighting off any French planes. At least one burst of small bombs was dropped during the forenoon among small boats proceeding from ship to shore but there were no reported casualties.

It is understood that orders had been given by the Task Force Commander (Admiral Hewett) to the admiral in charge of the naval air to pay particular attention to air combat patrols. However, the air apparently paid more attention to endeavoring to secure general control of the air than to combat patrols with the result that a very few planes were able to be very annoying. Throughout the day there was some sniping, especially from Point Fedalah. All civilians were cleared out of Point Fedalah the night of D-1.

No troops were ever landed on Yellow beach 2. Company I of the 7th Infantry was landed about five miles northeast of Fedalah at about noon and later joined the third battalion which had come ashore, in its assembly area. The 3rd Reconnaissance Troop, which was supposed to be landed at Yellow 2 came ashore late in the morning and landed at Red Beach and led the attack on the Point Fedalah batteries. The failure of these two elements to land at the beach prescribed or anywhere to the west of Fedalah undoubtedly contributed to the delay in reducing the batteries at Point Fedalah, and the consequent success of these batteries in enfilading the beaches, resulting in casualties. The movement into the transport areas was screened by destroyers, the admiral directing these ships be alerted for surface craft and submarines. In the transport area the cruiser Augusta covered the west and northwest approaches, and the cruiser Brooklyn the approaches from the east and northeast. An American submarine had been carefully prepared to reconnoiter and mark the red beaches, and for identification, special infra-red telescopes were issued to the responsible naval officers. It is understood that these telescopes were never used and the friendly submarine was consequently never identified as a guide into the Red Beaches.

A visit the night of D-1 D by Colonel Wilbur to the Admiral commanding that area in an effort to secure a peaceful surrender was not productive of results. Colonel Wilbur landed at Fedalah in the night, his jeep was wrecked in landing, but he procured a French car and continued to Casablanca. The result was that it was anticipated that the



shore batteries which were under the command of the French navy would open fire. The aid and at 6:17 A.M. our navy flashed the command, "Play Ball", which meant "Take vigorous offensive action". The Brooklyn answered the fire of Fort Duport (a four gun battery, 158.6 mm.) at Point Blondin, 6:17 A.M. while destroyers bombarded the batteries of Point Fedalah (one 4 gun 150 mm. battery and one 2 gun 75 mm. battery). Other ships opened up on the defenses at Casablanca. One oil tank at Point Fedalah was set on fire. It is interesting to note that in the preliminary plans a warning was given to endeavor not to hit the oil tanks for fear that the blaze would light the beaches. As a matter of fact the smoke drifted over the beach and from many observation points was a perfect blanket for the transports and they been subjected to shore battery action. The smoke from the many salvos of the Brooklyn also caused a haze over the transport area and all of these gave cover for the ships.

A great many small boats were stranded on the shores after their first landings, but no tugs were available to pull them off. There were approximately 125 boats beached on the Red beaches and around 75-100 on the Blue beaches. After fire had been opened on the Red Beaches the order was sent by Captain Emmett to the transports to land no more troops. The result was that scores of small boats milled around the transport areas for several hours during the middle of the day with no effort being made to land troops or supplies on beaches which were not under fire.

Early in the forenoon General Patton requested that the transports be moved closer in so as to make the haul to the beach shorter, and this was done. The French merchant ship (the Lumerle) which was found in the transport area and boarded by a crew from the navy, was moved along with the transports.

The night of D day LT 1-7 was relieved by the 2nd Bn 20th Engineers and went into regimental reserve. The 15th infantry was moved to the southwest on the left flank of the 7th Infantry prepared to take up the advance toward Casablanca the following morning.

The next attack jumped off at 7:30 A.M. November 9th toward Casablanca. It encountered little opposition with the exception of mounted patrols and some hostile artillery fire late in the afternoon when forward elements of the division came within range of the fixed defenses of Casablanca. Units of the division were in contact along the Waddi Nafifikh with elements of the 1st Chasseurs D'Afrique from Rabat, which had left Rabat at 10:00 A.M., Sunday November 8. The regiment was equipped with armored cars and 50 caliber machine guns. The units in Casablanca were Moroccan Colonials. There were a number of artillery batteries in the outskirts of Casablanca. The 7th Infantry was harassed with fire while advancing along the shore roads. The enemy was largely occupied during this period in an organization of their defenses at Casablanca, sending out small delaying parties to slow up the advance toward the city. The forward movement halted about 2:00 P.M. by division order because of the lack of supplies and ammunition. General Anderson did not want to make an all-out attack to take the city before he was assured of adequate ammunition and supplies, and the supplies were not coming up in the quantities required because of the lack of adequate motor transport and the inability of the "Jeeps" and the 1/2 ton trucks

to carry sufficient amounts.

Not only was there no adequate motor transport available but supplies were not coming off the boats as fast as anticipated. On the morning of the 9th the surf was from 4 to 6 feet high, and it was with the greatest difficulty that boats were landing on Red beaches. Approximately half the available landing craft had been wrecked by this time and many soldiers had been drowned. The order was given to land in only the port of Fedalah with small boats. The Navy was waiting for high tide in the mid-afternoon to bring in the first ship (only four ships of the convoy could be brought into Fedalah because of the depth of the channel). The Proctor came in at 2:00 P.M. and started unloading on the one berth available. The channel is not deep enough to bring any more ships into the harbor for anchorage. Landing craft came in and landed at all available spaces and cargo was lifted onto the docks. Brig. General Wm. Campbell of the 3rd Division improvised a scheme of loading life rafts with ammunition and towing a string of them behind a landing craft in order to expedite the handling of cargo. The 36th Engineers were in charge of the unloading reinforced by about 300 sailors which were made available by Captain Sickle. The 36th Engineers and the navy personnel did a herculean task and worked until absolutely exhausted when they were relieved on the morning of the 10th by details from the 20th Engineers.

The armored landing team landed at Fedalah on the evening of November 9, moved to the vicinity of Oued Mellah the next morning, and on the afternoon of November 10 moved to a position south of Casablanca prepared to take part in the offensive the following morning. At daybreak on the morning of November 10 the 7th and 15th regimental landing teams continued the advance southwest toward Casablanca. They soon gained contact with enemy patrols and from that time until the Armistice they were in constant contact with the enemy. The 7th RLG especially received heavy small arms and machine gun fire and its right flank was subjected to bombardment from two French destroyers which were operating just out the entrance to Casablanca harbor. However, RLG 7 pushed ahead along the main highway and along the coast and held a position by nightfall along the eastern outskirts of the city.

One company of the RLG 15 was held up at a cross road southeast of Casablanca for a considerable time during the morning out by dusk the team had occupied the high ground south and southeast of the city, Oulad el Melouk and Bled Oulad Cheik. It is understood that in this one company there were 14 killed, including the company commander, and 10 wounded. Continued efforts were made by General Patton and Admiral Hewett to induce the French to capitulate.

The main bridges leading into Casablanca had been mined and there were a number of road blocks erected on the main highways leading into the city. There had been negligible opposition from enemy front line units on the afternoon and evening of the 10th. Small groups of mechanized cavalry were apparently the only hostile units. They made continued attacks with old Renault light tanks against outposts north of Wadi Nefifikh.

However, there was intermittent shelling of roads of approach to Casablanca from the east by coast defense batteries and antiaircraft guns in Casablanca as well as destroyers. The enemy evidently had no mobile artillery.

On the morning of November 11th, the order to cease firing was given by General Patton at the 3rd Division CP. Although there had been many faults in communication especially from ship to shore, all elements of the command received the order before H hour. The cruisers and destroyers received it about 15 minutes before they were ready to open fire. A coordinated attack had been carefully worked out. At that time LCG's 7 and 15 supported by light and medium artillery and the Armored LT were in the eastern and southern outskirts of Casablanca prepared to attack. The French artillery position had been definitely located and arrangements had been made for support from naval dive bombers. The cruisers and destroyers of our Navy were to complete the destruction of all French naval craft.

At 5:19 A.M. the following message was sent from General Patton to Admiral Hewett. "Urgent. Enemy may capitulate in next few hours stop. Please make arrangements to cause immediate cessation of air and naval gun fire action receipt of message from the text of which follows immediately after this message."

At 7:00 A.M. the following message was sent. "Urgent to Augusta cease firing immediately. Acknowledge immediately. Patton." At that time General Patton was at the command post of the 3rd Division. There were only 30 minutes to go before H hour, which was announced as 7:30 A.M.

As soon as the army capitulated, the following message was sent by Admiral Hewett at 7:55 A.M. "For Patton from Hewett. Please send following to commander French Naval Forces Casablanca. "Report whether you intend forcing me destroy your ship and shore installations and spill the blood of your people. The decision is your individual responsibility. If you join your army in capitulation report whether any mine fields exist to prevent my entering Casablanca and send pilot to my flagship immediately. Admiral Hewett commanding United States Naval Forces." Some difficulty was encountered in getting the message to Admiral Michelier, who commanded the French Naval forces in the Casablanca area. But he finally sent word that the Navy would surrender and he would attend an Armistice conference. At 8:05 A.M. General Patton sent a message to Admiral Hewett requesting that he or his representative come to the Miramar Hotel, Fedalah, to attend a discussion of the armistice terms.

In order to gain time (while the armistice terms were being discussed) in appraising the condition of the port of Casablanca as a result of naval bombardment, General Patton sent a party headed by Brig. General Arthur Wilson to that city which included one captain and one Lieut. Commander of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces WTF, and a few other officers. They called upon the division commander of the French division occupying Casablanca, paid their respects, secured his entire cooperation, including the immediate detail of army trucks to assist in clearing the supplies from

the docks at Fedalah. A conference was then held with the Chief of Staff, Contre-Admiral Missoffe, who assigned a naval captain, a merchant marine officer, and a member of the harbor board to inspect the harbor with our naval officers in order to estimate the number of ships which could be docked. A reconnaissance was made of the air field at the same time and radio message sent to the carriers to land their planes on the Casablanca air field. By 4:00 P.M. the party had returned to Fedalah and had made a complete report of the condition of the port. The Armistice Conference was still continuing. It ended about 6:00 P.M.

The following named forces were encountered by the 3rd Division during the action.

Cavalry Patrols.

Five battalions of infantry.

Two battalions of field artillery (75 mm.); each of three batteries of four guns each.

One battery, 105 mm. howitzer.

Two batteries, 155 mm.

Five batteries, 75 mm. AT., two guns per battery.

Light armored units amounting to about 3 companies of Renault and Hotchkiss tanks numbering about 20 in all. (Two were captured and 4 destroyed; 5 were found broken down).

Curtiss-type pursuit planes

Several 25 mm. anti-tank guns.

Coast defense guns at Point Blondin (4 138 mm.)

4 90 mm. guns Point Fedalah; 2 75 mm. guns Point Fedalah.

Naval gun fire from French destroyers.

Most of the trouble was caused by the two batteries at Point Fedalah (one 4 gun 90 mm. battery and one 2 gun 75 mm. battery). These batteries withstood a series of bombardments from destroyers. The 90 mm. battery was neutralized by naval gun fire, but the 75 mm. battery was never neutralized. It was finally captured by the 7th Infantry. It was still able to shoot. An inspection made the following day showed that one tube was penetrated by shell fragment and the lower recoil mechanism

10-C

of the other gun was also punctured. However, it would still shoot at medium ranges. The breach blocks of the 90 mm. battery had been thrown into the sea by its crews but, had it not been for that fact, it could still shoot. There was ample ammunition. During this firing by destroyers and one cruiser, many of the shells were over and did considerable damage to the town of Fedala, the civilian population and casualties to our own soldiers.

The battery at Point Blondin consisted of four 138.6 mm. guns, partially encased with large concrete aprons in front to protect against muzzle blast. The battery had range drums graduated to 18,045 meters. The No. 1 gun recoil mechanism was damaged but it was not put out of action. There were six shell craters near the battery and the dispersion was from the sea (where many shells fell short) to about 1000 yards over land with a deflection bracket of about 800 yards.

Artillery fire was undoubtedly the most serious resistance offered as well as the most demoralizing to our infantry. At no time in the initial landing or during the advance to Casablanca was any determined resistance offered any infantry units. Only a small amount of ammunition (15 rounds or less per rifle) was issued to the troops, and their orders were merely to establish contact. Sporadic strafing attacks were carried out by pursuit planes on November 8, 9, 10, chiefly on our beaches east of Fedala. It appeared, however, that much of this could have been more accurate and that the French Air Corps was not doing its best. One group of small bombs were dropped among small ships coming in from the transports, but as far as could be found out, no hits were made.

On the 9th a single large bomber attacked the cruiser Brooklyn with 100 pound bombs and secured two near misses. The beaches east of Fedala were bombed on the morning of the 9th and the morning of the 10th. No landings were being made over the beaches on the 10th. A request was made on the 9th to naval air that our fighter planes be directed to stop strafing on the landing beaches.

The Navy had to wait for high tide to put the first ship, the Arcturus, into Fedala harbor on the afternoon of the 9th. It was unloaded about 70% by the afternoon of the 10th and was taken out and the Procton brought in in order to get motor vehicles which were on that ship. The next ship to be brought in was the Oberon followed by the French merchantman Lumerle, although there were two other American ships with small enough draft to be brought into the harbor. Just why this was done, I am unable to say. It was stated that the Lumerle was loaded with American trucks. There were about 60 on the ship, but they were of an inferior quality and many of them not in running condition, while the two American ships still lying off the beach not only had more trucks, but also a great amount of other cargo which could have been unloaded at the dock.

No American ship was brought into the harbor of Fedala on the eleventh of November and no ships were brought

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(1)

into Casablanca harbor. The Hennes was torpedoed off the beach at Fedalah on the night of the 11th. No ships were brought into the harbor on the 11th and on the evening of the 12th at about 5:30 P.M. the Scott, Bliss, Little, the tanker Winoski, destroyer Hamilton were torpedoed. The transports were all sunk. The Electra, en route from Lyautey to Fedalah, was also torpedoed. It was ordered to be docked (the ship is now in Casablanca harbor and that equipment is not damaged will be salvaged.) The Hennes was the least unloaded of any ship, probably about 10% being unloaded. It was understood that the others were unloaded about 80%. Following the last torpedoing on the night of the 12th, the admiral decided to go to sea. The first ships were put into Casablanca harbor the night of November 13. Immediately following the torpedoing every small boat able to run was dispatched to the transport area. The Mayor, school teacher, doctors and leading citizens were called into consultation by General Patton and all school houses, churches, hotels and the casino made available for wounded.

There were insufficient medical supplies and equipment to take care of the emergency operations, the doctors in many instances being forced to operate on burned and wounded men by signal corps flashlights only. As soon as possible the electrical equipment from the signal corps and ordnance mobile maintenance units were put into use to light the temporary hospitals.

The theory on the submarine attack is that there was some team work between the submarines and searchlights on the shores which were turned on and silhouetted the ships in the transport area immediately before the torpedoing started. Messages were sent from the Navy to General Patton's Headquarters to take steps to run down and turn out the searchlights. Orders were given to shoot out searchlights and turn off the power.

Most of the casualties in the French was among the Navy which put up the most determined resistance. About 300 French prisoners were taken by the 3rd Division, including about 75 on a train en route from Rabat to Casablanca. All French prisoners were released on orders of General Patton after having been held about 40 hours. Those who expressed desire not to be released were kept.

At Fedalah a number of local police and gendarmes were taken prisoner on the initial landing, but after a short time they were released, their arms returned, and they were directed to maintain order among the French population.

Practically all of the material captured was of old type and in poor condition.

One French vessel which had been loaded for Dakar was captured in the port of Fedalah with the following armament on board.

30 1½ ton trucks.

30 ½ ton panel trucks.

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5 40 mm. At guns with wooden wheels.

one 47 mm. AT gun.

Two other AT weapons, about 20 mm.

3 - 100 mm. guns at Point Blondin.

There were approximately ~~about~~ 200 members of the German Armistice Commission on duty in Casablanca, but none of them were captured because of the delay in entering the city. In addition to the Miramar Hotel in Fedalah, the following places were searched for Germans and equipment seized in Casablanca.

Mirador Hotel	(Casablanca)
Anfa	"
Pagoda	"
Suisse	"
Villa Mas	"
Italian Consulate	"
Nat'l Emancipation	"

The Villa Mas which was taken over by the 3rd Division as headquarters is a very pretentious residence which cost approximately \$500,000. This was used as the place of residence for the German general in charge of the Armistice Commission in Morocco and as his principal office. Private telephone lines with German equipment, telephones and switchboard, ran to all German missions in Morocco. A list of the German sympathizers was captured.

The attitude of the French Army and the citizens generally was very sympathetic to the United States. At first they didn't know who was attacking them (except those who had been informed by the Bureau of War Information in the United States over the radio). Some thought the Americans were Germans; some of the soldiers thought they were Italians, whom they hate. It was not for a period of time that they realized the attacking forces were Americans because not until daylight could they see the flags.

The attitude of the officers of the French Army and Navy reminded one of the days of chivalry; they fought because they had orders to do so, but when they surrendered they immediately became our allies.

The attached photostats show the disposition of French and American troops on the morning of November 11th. (Inclosures A-1 to A-3)

The attached map showing the disposition of French troops was secured from the German Armistice Commission in Fedalan. This map was used with good results by our forces.

**B. Safi.****(1) The Plan**

(a) The general plan was to have two destroyers (Bernador and Cole) with a complement of 200 men each enter directly into the harbor at Safi at H hour and land two companies of infantry. One company was to seize the dock, capture what was known as the "Portuguese Battery" then continue to the "barracks" and attack that place which was supposed to be occupied by about 800 soldiers.

(b) Another company of infantry was to land from a destroyer.

(c) The 47th combat team (consisting of the Second Battalion, 47th Infantry reinforced) was to land at Houdi Beach (yellow beach) eight miles south of Safi and attack the town from the south and west.

(d) The first Battalion 47th Infantry reinforced was to land north of Safi on blue beach and attack the town from the north and east.

(e) The Third Battalion 47th Infantry (I and M Companies reinforced) was to land on green beach.

(f) Particular attention was to be paid to reinforcements from Marrakech.

**(2) Execution of the plan.**

(a) The destroyers entered the Port at H hour and moved to the docks without opposition. There were no losses.

(b) The companies which landed from the destroyer did not make anywhere the progress anticipated. In the plan, too little time was allocated for the accomplishment of the tasks.

(c) The only enemy activity encountered in the Safi sector was occasional sniping from the outskirts of the town. The enemy artillery fire was not serious. The enemy armored resistance was slight and ineffectual. No horse cavalry was encountered. The French infantry adopted only defensive tactics and when encountered quickly surrendered or withdrew. There was no organized enemy anti-tank fire. Only three sorties were flown by individual planes.

(d) The sea train Lakehurst was docked at about 12 noon on November 8 and commenced unloading. It took three days to unload the train. Sniping from the buildings in the town was effectively stopped by 75 mm. self-propelled mount.

(e) On November 9 an enemy column consisting of 50 trucks containing approximately one infantry battalion, one battery field artillery, and one troop Cavalry, portee, was reported moving toward Safi from Marrakech. This column was machine-gunned by naval aviation on way to bomb airfield at Marrakech and again strafed by the same aircraft on return. Fifteen tanks from Safi force finally dispersed this threat. On



November 10 the armored column moved north, leaving the 47th Infantry to guard Safi. The unit was prepared to attack at Mazagan at daylight of November 11, when stopped by the armistice at 7:45 A.M. The French had barricaded the bridge over the Oued Ouf El Reta which protected Mazagan.

(f) The following enemy forces were encountered.

2 Companies 2 REI (2d Regt. Etrangere d'Infanterie, "Foreign Legion".)  
 2d and 3d Btrys 2 RLA (Artillery of 2 REI)  
 2 Companies (probably 1st Co. and a detachment) 2 REI  
 (2d Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains)  
 3d Btry GPF (155 mm) (All elements with this battery may have been a detachment of 410th Bn, LCA (Defense Contre Avions)  
 Detachment 41st Engr. Bn.  
 1 Plat. tanks from 11 GACA (11th Groupe Autonome de Chasseurs d'Afrique).  
 1 Naval Coast Defense Btry 138 mm (4 guns)  
 1 Naval Coast Defense Btry 75 mm (2 guns)  
 1st Bn. 2 REI (2d Regt. Tirailleurs Marocains)  
 2d Bn. 2 REI  
 11th GACA  
 3d Bn., 2 REI (2d Regt. d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc)  
 1 Co. of PTS (6th Regt. Tirailleurs Senegalais)

There were nine French officers and 230 men taken prisoners. French casualties were estimated at about 300 killed and wounded. The interrogation of prisoners in the Safi area gave the same information as in the Fedalah-Casablanca area. The attack in general was a complete surprise.

(g) The following Coast defenses were encountered in the Safi area:

POINTE DE LA TOUR - Four 138mm Naval Guns; destroyed.  
 BLUE BEACH (North of Port) - Two 75 mm Guns; captured.  
 Two Batteries motorized; various locations (eight 75 mm. howitzers); destroyed or captured.  
 One Battery (155mm) 3,000 yards South of Safi; bombed; engaged by Naval gunfire; destroyed or captured.  
 No positive reports of total strength in the vicinity of Dou Guedra. One estimate by experienced artilleryman that one battalion of 75 mm was firing at range of 9,500 yards.  
 Three 75mm. guns destroyed by French after motor transportation burned by Naval air in the Dou Guedra vicinity.

(h) The first warning was given by Chief Quartermaster Liviere who stated that our convoy had been seen off Sali by him from his observation post of the Naval Coast Defense Battery at 3 A.M., November 8, 1942. This naval non-commissioned officer was second in command of the Naval Defense Forces. He immediately gave the warning which aroused the officers and men of the garrison and placed the garrison in a state of alert.

(i) The naval personnel captured other than the Coast Defense Batteries, consisted of one officer and three sailors from the submarine "Eduse". These men stated that the submarine had been placed in a state of alert at about 3 A.M., November 8th, and that they had sailed from Casablanca earlier that morning together with other submarines of the 2nd Submarine Flotilla. Two of these were sunk by our dive bombers before they got out of the harbor. The "Eduse" attempted to return to the harbor but was unable to do so. On Sunday night while running on the surface, she was machine gunned and several crew members were wounded. She then made for Sali and just off the Pointe de la Tour, she sent a small boat ashore with one officer and three men. These men came ashore and walked towards Sali where they were taken into custody by our troops. The submarine then vanished and they did not know whether she had sunk as a result of damage sustained or whether she had sailed away. The submarine subsequently came ashore 40 kilometers south of Mazagan.

(j) Second Lieutenant Walters of the Intelligence Section of the 2nd Armored Division reported that he interviewed Capt. Englante who was a member of the garrison at Marrakech and had previously been a tank commander in the Battle of France. He stated that on Sunday morning at 1 A.M., November 8th, General Martin, Commanding Officer of Marrakech, had called a meeting of his officers and informed them that General Giraud had taken command of the French Forces in North Africa, and that he had desired to have the German Armistice Commission arrested, and designated Capt. Englante to make the arrest. However, just as the meeting was breaking up, the warning came from Sali and General Martin placed his alert plan into effect.

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C. Port Lyautey  
(1) Plan

(a) The landing team was to land on Red Beach, two miles north, proceed inland to the main highway, then turn south and proceed to the Sabou River.

(b) Another landing team was to land on Blue Beach about one mile north of Port Lyautey, proceed inland and attack toward the south.

(c) A destroyer was to patrol the Sabou River.

(2) Execution of Plan

(a) Probably the most stubborn resistance on the entire West African coast was encountered by the American forces which landed in the Port Lyautey sector.

(b) The S-2 of the Task Force was unsuccessful in contacting French officers in an effort to reach an understanding without battle.

(c) The attack at H hour was delayed about two hours because of difficulty by the Navy in getting into the transport area. As the transports went into the area, all lights in the town were on and did not go out until about midnight.

(d) There was little resistance on Blue Beach, no resistance on Red Beach No. 1, but considerable resistance on Red Beach No. 2. The Dallas was unable to move up the Sabou River because of a submarine net.

(e) It was the opinion of some of the officers that had they been able to land on time, they would have captured Lehdiu by daylight and the airport by noon.

(f) Shore batteries opened fire and the Savannah and a destroyer returned it. About eight shells from the transport area. The transports then moved forward several yards. This slowed down the landing of the troops.

(g) During the period from noon on the 8th until noon on the 9th interdiction fire came from the ridge east of the lagoon in the vicinity of Kasba, and the enemy was able to bring up reinforcements to this position. The fort at Kasba was taken during the afternoon of the 8th but recaptured by the French during the night when waves of reinforcements of French suddenly launched a counter attack. Every man in this expedition without regard to normal duties was engaged in combat, including the staff of John Truscot. It took hard fighting to capture the fort at Kasba.

(h) Late on Monday the 9th the Port Lyautey Airport was seized by a company of infantry which landed on the beach several miles north of its originally designated spot and by sweeping wide around the French flank reached the airport destroying several French planes on the ground. South and east of the lagoon an estimated sixteen enemy tanks were repulsed and

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forced back by about 1/3 as many American tanks led by Colonel Semmes. During the night of 9-10 November 42 the submarine net across the Sabou River was cut by two Navy Lieutenants enabling the Destroyer Dallas to proceed six miles up the river to the airport to complete the control of the airfield at Lyautey.

(i) The fort at Kasba was recaptured Tuesday morning 10 November 42 in hand to hand fighting after French defenses had been softened by terrific naval bombardment. By 2200 November 10, the enemy had withdrawn to the south and east when the order to cease fire had been given.

(j) The rocket gun proved valuable during this engagement. One detachment of eight men from boat crews were put under a lieutenant and taught the use of the rocket gun in a few minutes, then sent into the fight. No reserves were kept out. (See special report on rocket gun, Inclosure B attached.)

(k) All communications from ship to shore failed. The only communication was that of the naval gunfire shore parties. Because the Commanding General and his staff were engaged in active fighting, it was impossible for the naval commander to receive messages from him or to locate his command post.

(l) Some officers thought that boat crews were not sufficiently supervised; that there were insufficient reliefs for boat crews with the result that some deserted their boats on the beaches.


(m) The self-propelled mounts proved devastating and were the most feared weapon by the French. Guns which were out of ammunition were still successful as a threat.

(n) It is estimated that about 850 French were taken prisoner, and 700 casualties.

#### GENERAL REACTIONS OF THE FRENCH.

The reaction of the French officers immediately after capture, as summarized from all three of the supporting task forces, was about as follows:

(a) Most of them were anti German, violently anti-Italian, and they were all apparently hoping for our victory, yet disapproving of the methods which we were using to achieve it. No leaflets had been dropped; no one had heard President Roosevelt speak although some had heard the announcement from London that American troops were attacking western and northern Africa. There was, however, a general impression that something might happen soon. This was just a vague feeling based on nothing more than idle gossip. They did not know they were fighting Americans until just before they were captured. Most of them stated that it would not have made any difference



and that they would have fought anyone that attempted to land, in accordance with their orders. The lack of logic of their hope for our victory and their resistance was not apparent to any of them. It was, however, equally evident that they believed that the length and seriousness of any such resistance would be largely determined by the size of the force that we were employing. The officers were neat, dignified and loquacious. The mass of the enlisted personnel was clearly overjoyed at our arrival but stated they had obeyed the orders of their superiors to fire upon us. The non-commissioned officers were almost equally wholeheartedly in our favor. The Naval personnel, both officers and sailors, were markedly antagonistic towards us. While the discussion of the armistice terms was going on between Admiral Michelier and General Patton and staff at the Viromar Hotel, in Fedala, a group of Army and Naval officers, of which I was senior, was arranging to inspect the port of Casablanca to determine its damage and also the air field. While Admiral Michelier, Chief of Staff, was stiff, he was polite. Two French Naval Captains, however, refused to shake hands.

All French personnel expressed great admiration for the equipment and training of the American troops. They were particularly impressed with the fact that all motor equipment was kept running (as a matter of fact, I was myself); there were very few motor vehicles of any kind out of action. The crews and maintenance crews did a marvelous work in keeping them going.

The French were not certain of our mission. They were afraid that we were still trying to dismember the French Empire. They particularly distrust the British. Some even thought the American troops were German. The great majority of the native population is apparently unaware that the United States is at war with Germany. Many of the natives were afraid that they would be sent out of the country.



(b) It had been intimated to the soldiers that if they did not fight, further retaliations would be made against French prisoners held in Germany.

(c) Many of the native French soldiers are very young (18-21). They joined the colonial forces to escape labor conscription for Germany. (They tell all types of horror stories in connection with forced labor conscription.)

(d) Most French soldiers took the attitude that this was an unfortunate misunderstanding. They were in a dilemma, between two fires literally and figuratively:

Staff officers pro-Vichy vs. Field officers pro United States  
Good soldiers follow orders vs. Respect for the United States

Some feared that this was another Dieppe and that we would not remain to retain control.

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(c) All appeared to be sincerely friendly to the United States and will do anything as long as it is fighting the Germans.

(f) Most respected BERTIN because he gave his word to Germany under the terms of the armistice to defend the colonial empire.

(g) The division from Meknes was loaded hurriedly on trains, told it was going on an exercise, was handed outworn equipment. The men did not realize until the last minute that they were going to fight.

(h) In Port Lyautey the intellectuals who were sympathizers with the Allies had lost their professional status and were compelled to perform menial duties. (e. g. School teachers were compelled to take care of pigs; and an ex-chief of police became a waiter in a restaurant.)

(i) There was resentment at the fact restrictions had been put on the inhabitants of this region by German mandate; not allowed to listen to American broadcasts, see American movies; orchestras were forbidden. There was evidence as to the misrepresentation of the course of the war. (e. g. "Philadelphia is bombed by the Japanese", etc.) Few knew anything about the general progress of the war on the European front.

(j) Prisoners, when released, expressed their gratitude for the way in which they were treated. They thought the food excellent and were delighted with cigarettes and chewing gum. "Comradé," "à bientôt", "nous sommes amis", etc., were expressed by French soldiers.

(k) Some of the French people stated that they had been expecting the Americans for months.

#### CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ARMAMENT

The battery at Kasba near Port Lyautey consisted of four obsolete 138.6 mm. guns on fixed mounts without ammunition, and two obsolete 155.6 mm. guns in emplacements and four of the same caliber in the open. There was one direct hit by a six-inch shell near the trunnions of one gun and damage to the fire control equipment.

At Kinitka airport there were four 77 mm. pedestal mount anti-aircraft guns and two 155 mm. GPF's at the mouth of the Oued Sejou. There was an extensive trench system built about the guns. There was no effect on any of these guns although there were several craters nearby and one 14" dud in the center area of the guns. Several hits were secured on the buildings of the airport and considerable damage caused. The guns and director system had been sabotaged by the French.

The armament at El Hank guarding the Casablanca harbor comprised two four-gun batteries of 194 mm. ranged to 25,000 meters and one battery of four guns of 100 mm. Two of the heavy guns had been slightly damaged by fragments and the light battery had not been hit. The fire control station had slight damage. This battery had been subjected to a heavy bombardment by the 16-inch guns of the Battleship Massachusetts and by 100 pound air bombs but in spite of this fact all guns could function with local

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control. The fire control and telephone systems had been put out of order. Comandante Bertrand stated that he had a little ammunition left, and that his guns were still fully effective. There were a number of 16-inch guns around the guns, one between two headquarters buildings which the French had put up on end as an exhibit.

The antiaircraft battery north of Casablanca had been reported as heavy 8-inch coast defense guns. As a matter of fact, it was a 90 mm. mobile antiaircraft gun for a battery which ~~was sited~~ primarily for antiaircraft fire but which was also used on ground targets. It was sabotaged by breechblocks being taken from guns and fire control equipment damaged before it was captured by an Infantry platoon.

The two gun 75 mm. battery at Point Fedela withstood a series of bombardments from destroyers before it was finally put out. One tube was penetrated by a shell fragment and the lower recoil machinery of the other gun was punctured by a fragment, but the gun is still able to fire at short ranges.

The four gun 90 mm. battery was still intact with plenty of ammunition. The breechblocks had been thrown into the sea in order to disable the guns.

The battery at Point Blondin consisted of four 138.6 mm. guns with large concrete aprons in front to protect against muzzle blast. The battery had range drum graduations to 18,045 meters. The number 1 gun recoil mechanism was damaged but it was not put out of action. There were six shell craters near the battery and the dispersion was from the sea (where many shells fell short) to about 1000 yards over and with a deflection of about 800 yards.

#### RESUME

The entire amphibious operation was the largest operation of its kind in the history of warfare. Never before had so many combat loaders sailed the seas at one time. In the Western Task Force alone there were 110 ships (six were electric motor boats), including the escort and naval vessels. Twenty-two transport and cargo vessels were in the supporting forces at Iyautey, thirty-four at Casablanca and twenty-two, which included one sea train, at Safi. There were 292 airplanes on five carriers.

While it is possible to pick out isolated instances where the loading of ships might have been better done, where the unloading did not proceed with dispatch, where green troops the first time under fire did not act like veteran divisions, where the advance from the beach to the first objective was not done as experience had taught, where the weapons did not function properly, where the judgement of commanders might have been better, and other points; nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that a landing was made on the west coast of Africa where much considered, experienced and professional military thought held that a landing could not be made primarily because of the bad beach and surf conditions. It is believed that some observers who have not seen war at first hand before

and have never previously heard cannon go off in anger, might be unduly impressed with some of the things which they observed. But, war is messy; there is never a time when everything is perfectly correct; the dumps do not look like the orderly supply warehouses in training camps; supplies get mixed up equipment, used during stress, fails to function; people get killed and wounded; soldiers sometimes fail to function as they have been trained. Nevertheless, the American soldier quickly adapts himself to conditions. Those who took part in the African Campaign now consider themselves veterans. It is too bad that all of our divisions cannot have this sort of small initial baptism of fire before they go up against stronger competition; too bad they cannot all play in a minor league before trying the major league.

It is a fact that everything seemed to favor our attack - it was the calmest day on that coast in sixty-eight years; there was complete tactical surprise; the political situation was right; the French Army put up only mediocre resistance; the mistakes and errors which were made were corrected by brute strength and awkwardness and the initiative and resourcefulness of the troops.

Even the laws of error and the probability of the dispersion scale of the French men-of-war firing at the units of our Fleet was in our favor; finally, the spirit of the American people, carried to the shores of Africa by the fighting forces, which is to quickly forgive an enemy and make of him, if possible, a friend, soon solidified the French and Moroccan populace so that even though some elements had put up a bitter fight they were soon won over to our side.

The morale was high and the troops made every effort to carry out their training. They took every advantage of camouflage which was difficult in a barren terrain; fox holes were dug promptly.

The thought of the expedition was epitomized in the message (communicated to all Army units and relayed to all ships) which was sent by General Patton to Admiral Hewett on Sunday, November 15, which is as follows:

"It is my firm conviction that the great success attending the hazardous operations carried out on sea and on land by the Western Task Force would only have been possible through the intervention of Divine Providence manifested in many ways. Therefore, I should be pleased if, in so far as circumstances and conditions permit, our grateful thanks be expressed today in appropriate religious services and prayer."

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D. Recommendations.

1. Planning by the War Department.

It is believed that the War Department General Staff and the SOS should be more active and give more direction in the planning of an amphibian operation. Certainly, if a number of task forces have been assembled in the War Department and given their general directives, the officers of the General Staff and the SOS are more experienced in indicating to the commander and staff of the task force proper methods of procedure in the details of the expedition and in the preliminary training therefor. The commander and his staff may come to the War Department and be assigned to an amphibian task force without any prior training for such. It is recommended that key staff personnel who could be infiltrated into a staff for an amphibian operation be assembled in the War Department now and that these officers study the North African campaign and other operations so that their knowledge will be of some benefit to any new staff that may be formed in the future. There can be no question but that the spearhead of any attack that this country will make in the war will be amphibian. There are a great many policies regarding training, etc., which should be determined without further loss of time.

2. Planning and organization for supplies. It is believed that the War Department should be sure that organization commanders in an amphibian organization have properly planned and organized their commands for an initial supply with the full realization that the combat commanders must first look to the loading of their troops for combat. It is believed that the African operation in Western Task Force could have been organized more efficiently for supply.

The organization for supply should go down to the platoon leaders and the problem of supplies rehearsed in the same manner as a battalion maneuver.

It is probably not necessary to include special supply troops over and above the table of organization of a landing team to handle the supplies initially on the beaches. A reference to the table of organization of infantry and field artillery units indicates that the necessary trucks and labor can be found within the battalions. For example, there are approximately 140 men per infantry battalion, such as cooks, mechanics, etc., who are not initially necessary in landing. There are probably 400 men in an infantry regiment who can be organized to handle supplies on the beaches. Approximately 25 or 30 trucks are in the same category. The troops are eating emergency field rations for the first few days

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and there is no need for overhead in company administration. It is recommended that a study be made and tests carried out in the field to determine whether or not it is possible to adequately supply landing teams from troops within the organizations.

3. Equipment for use on beaches.

The equipment to be used on beaches will vary only slightly in different landing operations. It is recommended that the War Department secure all the data possible from units which landed in North Africa and also from the Marines, reconsider it and redesign some of the equipment which is used with landing teams. The following particular comments are made:

- a. The trucks, tractors, etc., should be equipped with winches.
- b. All tractors should be equipped with light and small cranes.
- c. The sleds to be used with tractors should be redesigned to get a maximum pay load (The sleds used in the WTF were too small).
- d. There should be a surplus of sleds because they get broken.
- e. There should be a surplus of cables and chains for towing sleds.
- f. Experiments should be carried out with infra-red beach markers to mark the approaches for landing boats. The boats should be provided with infra-red telescopes.
- g. The radio equipment used in amphibious operations should have the specifications of the Navy equipment which I understand includes special types for use near salt water.
- h. A more suitable life belt should be developed. The rubber inflated life belt is too liable to damage while the large Kapok life belt is too bulky. A life belt similar to the ones carried in airplanes might be more efficient.
- i. Amphibious cars and trucks must be developed.
- j. Small tugs for getting stranded boats off beaches should be provided.
- k. The T/BA does not provide <sup>sufficient</sup> ~~three~~ bull-dozers or small tractors for Engineer Companies. There should be three which should be handled with the personnel available.

#### 1. Overhead in Special Service Units.

It is believed that the American Army has too many fancy Special Service Units and that determined thought should be given in the War Department toward eliminating them entirely, combining units for more than one duty or reducing the number of personnel in all Service Units. The same rule should apply to the administrative overhead in combat units. Advantage should be taken of the availability of local labor wherever possible and this applies not only to Service Units in overseas expeditions but also to those on duty within the Continental United States.

#### 2. Position of Service of Supply Commander on Staff of Task Force.

It is recommended that the officer who is designated as the Chief of the Service of Supply of a task force, or as the Commander of a base sector, be included as a member of the G-4 and designated by the War Department as a Deputy Chief of Staff for the Task Force Commander. In this way, the SOS will be integrated from the very beginning in the plans of the Task Force Commander. Initially, the operation on a hostile shore is one of securing bases from which to operate. These bases in the future will become the primary responsibility of whoever is designated to head the supply functions. It should be the responsibility of the officer, who is to function as the base Commander after the base has been captured, to think from the very beginning in terms of the G-4. There was no consideration given to the problem of supply in the WTF beyond the landing of the troops on the beaches. No SOS troops or no SOS officers were on the D-day convoy. (While myself and two officers went with that convoy, it was through the courtesy of the Navy who gave up space assigned to their officers in order that the SOS might observe the situation from the beginning. There was no assignment made for any SOS personnel by the Task Force Commander.) The G-4 of the Task Force and his principal assistants were aboard the D / 5 convoy and actually did not arrive in the sector until D / 11. Only one assistant G-4, who had very little background, was on the D-day convoy. There was no one with whom the various civilian officials could confer on supply methods or the resources of the country. There was utter confusion at the landing beaches and docks in the handling of supplies because of lack of planning or any experienced personnel to take advantage of the facilities which were at once available when the port was captured. Personnel who first arrive in any sector will be more familiar with that sector than those who come later. It is therefore important that a small staff of SOS officers be included in the initial convoy of any amphibious force. Upon capture of a port they can immediately commence to inventory utilities, docks, railroads, etc., and take steps to utilize them. The docks at Fedala and Casablanca were jammed because the WTF did not have included in its D-day convoy a few key experts to take hold of the situation. The result was that railroads and dock facilities

were not properly used, dumps for supplies a few miles beyond the docks were not reconnoitered or designated and no plan or provision was made for the orderly handling of anything with the resulting delay in the unloading of ships. It is futile to agree that the combat efficiency of any landing force will be jeopardized to the slightest degree by the addition of a few key officers who are experts in the handling of such matters. After all, they are also trained and capable of handling weapons.

6. Handling of Supplies at Point of Debarkation. The following comments are made, not with the idea of criticising the handling of supplies in the WIF of the African Invasion, but to point them out in the hope that they may be of some help in future operations.

a. Use of Combat Troops. The Navy worked their men to the physical limit. Combat troops cannot be used for loading supplies unless they are properly supervised and unless they have previously done so in manoeuvres. This is an additional reason why experienced SOB officers should be present to direct and plan the use of combat troops for this purpose.

b. Crews for Winches. There should be more than one crew of winch-men trained on the ships. The unloading was slowed up by sheer fatigue of the Navy personnel manning the unloading machinery. Much of the equipment damaged in unloading was due, in my opinion, solely to the fact that the men operating the winches were working practically day and night and became so fatigued that they were unable to function in anywhere near a normal manner.

c. Winch Crews on Sea Trains. It is understood that winch crews on the sea train Lakhurst which unloaded at Safi had little or no training whatever in the unloading of the ship because the cranes and winches were handled at the New York port of embarkation when the ship was loaded by the personnel at the port of embarkation, and not by the crews who had to unload later. At any rate, the sea train was not unloaded at Safi with the dispatch with which it should have been.

d. Unloading from Ships. When loading of supplies is started over the beaches, supplies of one kind should be put on one boat. The sorting by class should be done on the ship rather than mixing rations, ammunition, gasoline, etc., all in one boat. If supplies are sorted on the ship, they arrive on the beach in small dumps by classes and if a battalion commander wants a particular kind of ammunition, the party in charge of the dumps on the beach knows where to send the ammunition detail.

e. Salvage on Beaches. The engineer shore party should quickly organize and salvage weapons and equipment which are thrown away by troops on beaches and reclaim them for use.

f. Use of Docks. Because of the lack of experienced railroad personnel the railroads on the docks of Fedalah and Casablanca were not properly used. At Fedalah the track could have been extended about 100 yards to the ship which would have made unloading directly on railroad cars feasible. The equipment, that is rails and ties, were available. At Casablanca the supplies were dumped on the railroad tracks in many cases which made it impossible to load into the trains. The supplies were hauled from one dock to warehouses on another dock instead of being put in dumps in the dock area.

7. Troops Too Heavily Loaded. There can be no question but what a great reduction must be made in weight of the equipment which is carried by our assault troops in an amphibian operation. The clothing that can be worn in the Mediterranean area is different from that which would be required in the Aleutian Islands; the equipment for heavy infantry is certainly different from that of amphibian troops for agility of initial landing is of primary importance. Many troops were drowned because the equipment was too heavy for the men to swim with if they accidentally got into the water. For example, there was no use in carrying bulky gas masks when all G-2 reports indicated no possibility of gas.

8. Special Amphibious Assault Troops. It is recommended that amphibious assault regiments especially trained and equipped be organized in the Army to be used to quickly overrun and neutralize enemy installations on the beaches, to enable the leading infantry elements to cross the beach and establish the beachhead. After the initial objective is taken the heavy infantry and standard divisions can be brought ashore and handled in the usual manner. Because of the fact that the divisions which landed in Africa will have to be used for further operations, the experience which they gained in landing on hostile shores cannot be taken advantage of for use in any other theater. If the assault troops are made up of especially trained units they can be withdrawn and especially used in future operations. These troops should include demolition units for the breaching of obstacles on beaches, units for the control of the movements of boats, shore fire control parties, liaison parties, parties to guard beaches and hazards, and special equipment such as rubber boats.

#### 9. Automatic Weapons.

Much criticism was heard from various officers and enlisted men on the function of the .51 rifle and the Thomson sub-machine gun. There is no question but what the mechanism became clogged with sand and seawater in many cases. Many officers believe that the 1903 Springfield with pyroret is superior to the .51 rifle for the initial landing on a hostile shore. One of the primary reasons is the simplicity and the reliability of cleaning the 1903 rifle over the .51. It is recommended that views of all platoons in the operations be secured in order that a proper evaluation can be made on the adaptability of these weapons for amphibious operations. Instead of taking the recommendations against these weapons as a result of isolated instances.

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10. Place of the Commanding General of the Task Force

The place for the Commanding General of the Task Force is not on a man-of-war during the landing operation. In Task Force A, General Patton was aboard the Cruiser Augusta with Admiral Hewitt. Early on the morning of November 8, the Augusta was in a series of naval engagements with the result that the Commanding General of the Task Force was cruising up and down the coast of Africa when he should have been on shore. It was impossible for the Augusta to stop its naval actions long enough to permit General Patton and his staff to get into a small boat. It is believed that the Commanding General of a Task Force should be on a combat loader.

Furthermore, the next in command and the next juniors on the general and special staff sections should be on a different ship than the commander and his staff so that if one transport is sunk there will still be available a commander and staff to carry on the operation.

The Deputy Commander and staff should be provided with the same means of communication as the commander and his staff.

11. Unloaded cargo being returned.

It is recommended that the Commanding General, SOS, in Washington require the Commanding General at the ports of embarkation to report the tonnage of all supplies (including excess naval supplies) which are returned to the ports unloaded at foreign ports; and that each officer in charge of particular bases be notified of the amount of tonnage so reported. It is obviously wrong to return ships unloaded in part. Due to submarine threat it may be necessary to return ships which have not been unloaded or which have been only partially unloaded but the officer in charge of supplies at ports of debarkation should be appraised of these tonnages. Every effort will be made at the Atlantic Base Port to unload vessels in the minimum time possible.

12. Shipments of supplies to Ports.

The transport quartermaster at a port must know the organization, arms, equipment, and supplies which go with each unit; and the weight, cube, and contents of all shipments arriving at the port to be loaded. They should not only know the priorities for loading but for unloading. Some of the ships in this convoy were not properly combat loaded. Inquiry as to the basic reason brought out the fact that the TCIS were not informed of the requirements in time to complete satisfactory loading plans. I was told that the air corps shipments to the port were the worst examples. The principal difficulty was that carload shipments came into the port of embarkation (as a result of computation made by SOS on the troop basis) marked and coded and specifically designated for various ships. The railroad cars were marked in general terms; for example, "explosive material" which might have been anything from hand-grenades to 105 mm. ammunition. The seals of the cars had to be broken open and in some cases the individual boxes to ascertain the contents. Obviously, it is necessary to know the exact contents of carload shipments coming into a port of embarkation if the supplies are to be properly combat loaded.

UNCLASSIFIED

28-C

UNCLASSIFIED

It is recommended that the next expedition be given at least three weeks for the planning of the loading. Class I, III, and V dumps should be established at each port, the carload lots going into these dumps for sorting before an effort is made to combat load the ships. It is desirable that the total supplies for the Task Force be in these dumps prior to loading but it is recognized that this will probably never be possible. At least, particular effort should be made to put into the hands of the port commander a list broken down by items of what is in each carload lot. When time is such that it is impossible to put all supplies in dumps prior to loading, then it is recommended that only one item of supply be shipped in one car in order to expedite combat loading. Class II and IV supplies must be segregated by particular ship. G-4 of the Task Force, the S-4 of the organizations, and the TQMS should consult frequently on loading.

13. Use of Trucks in Initial Landing. The stacking of 1/4-ton trucks in the holds of ships which has been developed by the amphibious force headquarters proved to be successful ("Jeeps" stacked end to end). Although there were a few days of rough weather, there was apparently little, if any, shifting of the vehicles during the voyage.

It is recommended that experiments be carried out to devise methods of stacking 2-1/2-ton trucks.

It is strongly recommended that in future landing operations the leading landing teams be equipped with some means of motor transportation other than 1/4-ton or 1/2-ton trucks. Granted that the "jeep" is a marvelous tactical vehicle it is NOT a vehicle for the transportation of supplies. Reliance was placed on this vehicle and on the 1/2-ton truck in the operations at Fedalah-Casablanca with the result that it was impossible to move supplies from the docks after they had been unloaded with sufficient rapidity to permit the unloading of ships to proceed without interruption. The attack had to be held up on D + 2 because of the inability to transport food and ammunition to the front line troops. One medical detachment had eight 2-1/2-ton trucks aboard which had been issued in lieu of ambulances and these trucks plus trucks secured from the French saved the situation. However, the transportation of supplies to the front was definitely not solved as a result of the planned loading of the combat loaders. It is believed that the most uneconomical of all trucks is the 1/2-ton trucks. The 2-1/2-ton truck is worth five 1/2-ton trucks and nine "jeeps" when cargo moving is involved and the space it takes to load the 2-1/2-ton truck in the ship is certainly not five or nine times the cargo space occupied by that number of 1/2-ton trucks or "jeeps". The 1/2-ton truck is too wide to load successfully in boats. Experience in maneuvers on land indicate that its silhouette is too high to be of any tactical use so the question may rightly be raised as to why we have any 1/2-ton trucks in the Army.

It is recommended that tests be conducted with the 3/4-ton truck, which has been adopted as a standard personnel carrier in the Army, to determine what minor changes have to be made in the bodies in order to permit the trucks to be loaded in the LCP(D) ships.

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It was found prior to embarking that the 3/4-ton truck is too wide by 4" to put into the LCP(D) landing boat. (This is due to noncoordination between Army and Navy and failure to have a joint test board for such equipment as boats and trucks to be submitted to before going into production.) Inquiry from the Navy indicates that the maximum modifications possible to make without changing the entire specifications of the hundreds of boats now on order have been made (I am informed that about 15,000 boats have been constructed); but this gives only a four inch clearance on each side which is insufficient for the cables which are attached to lower the boat, especially when the boat rolls on a sea. A clearance of about eight inches is necessary. This can probably be obtained by altering the specifications of the body by that number of inches. It is certainly easier to change slightly the specifications of the truck body than it would be to redesign completely the boats. That would give a clearance of twelve inches (six for each side of the truck) when loaded in a boat. The 3/4-ton ambulance and the carryall will go into the boats as at present constructed. It is only the body of the personnel carrier (which can also be used as a cargo carrier) which has to be altered.

It is recommended

- a. That a test hand-made body 8" narrower than the present personnel carrier body be constructed and sent to the Amphibious Force Headquarters for tests.
- b. That the present production of personnel carrier bodies for 3/4-ton trucks be suspended immediately.
- c. That the present stock of these vehicles be issued to organizations and posts which will not have to undergo amphibious training.

In any normal landing at a port, anti-aircraft defense will be the first requisite; therefore, anti-aircraft material should have a very high priority. In order to move this material expeditiously the prime movers are required. These same trucks could be well used for the transportation of supplies.

14. Naval Gunfire. It is recommended that arrangements be made with the Navy to provide bombardment ammunition and to use reduced charges in order to give curved trajectories for the support of landing operations. Armor piercing projectiles are of little use for bombardment against coast defense batteries or towns. The trajectories of Naval guns are too flat without using reduced charges to give the desired results. Naval gunfire was unable to silence the land batteries at Point Fedala because of their flat trajectories; the greatest effect was secured in the town of Fedala and on our own infantry advancing through the town. I read an order on the Augusta, when returning, which was issued by the Admiral of the Task Force to the effect that Naval vessels would range by single turrets; that bombardment ammunition would be used; that fire for effect would be executed at five-minute intervals and that a report would be made when 60% of the ammunition was expended. Although knowing very little about the technique of Naval gunfire it was apparent that the

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Cruiser Brooklyn observed none of those orders. It would be interesting to know how many rounds the Brooklyn actually fired on the battery at Point Blondin, near Fedalah, without destroying it. To the Army observer it appeared that the cruiser was ranging with broadside.

15. Erroneous Reports by Naval Air. A good example of acting on unverified information from aeroplane observation is the following sequence of events:

On November 9 the Jean Bart was bombed by Naval dive bombers and the Air Admiral of the Navy reported to the Augusta that they had dropped ten bombs; there were seven direct hits on the battleship, two near misses and one on the docks near by; and that the Jean Bart was left in flames, or words to that effect. On November 10 two destroyers of the French Navy were harassing the right of the Third Division as it moved along the coast and the main road between Fedalah and Casablanca and Major General Jonathan Anderson requested that these destroyers be eliminated. The Cruiser Augusta (without verifying the report of damage to the Jean Bart by Air Reconnaissance) steamed in to take the destroyers under fire and when about 14,500 yards from the harbor the Jean Bart opened fire on the Augusta. She fired ten two-round salvos. Seven of these salvos were nearly correct in deflection and one round was short and one over on the Augusta; one two-round salvo fell on one side of the cruiser and another two-round salvo fell about mid-ship on the other side, the splashes of water being sufficiently near by to drench those on the bridge; the tenth salvo was erratic and was several hundred yards short. Obviously, only the probable error of the 15-inch guns of the — Jean Bart saved the Augusta from a true hit. (The 15-inch guns of the Jean Bart had a range of 35,000 yards.) An inspection of the battleship made on the morning of November 11 showed that while the aft turret had been put out of action by the dive bombers the forward turrets and the fire control system were still intact.

16. Training En Route. More attention could be put to detailed training of troops while en transport en route to debarkation areas. All boats in a convoy should be combat loaded even those in reserve because troops initially placed in reserve may be put into the initial landing.

Every ship should be provided with silhouettes and clay models of the beaches on which the troops are to land in order that every soldier will be thoroughly familiar with the outline of prominent land marks and the general topography of the beach where he is supposed to land and also the near-by beaches where he might be landed. The ship on which I sailed had no such models and I was informed that the reason was because the troops on that ship were not supposed to land until the beach head had been established. As a matter of fact, twenty-one boats from that particular ship were detailed to other ships to take assault troops on the first wave. However, it is also important for the sailors and navigators who pilot the small boats to be thoroughly familiar with the beach on which they are to land. Furthermore, a ship may be in reserve in the plan initially but the personnel of that ship may be among the first to land by the time they reach their destination.

INCL. A-1

[illegible]

Ind de Goulhaat.  
3 Jours de jours  
Jours - 1 batillon en  
effectifs

ALL INFORMATION  
5/RICH & Morgan  
1 Section 4045 PT

2500 yds of 75mm guns (4 guns)  
 2500 yds of 105mm " " 2:  
 2500 yds of 105mm " " 2:  
 2500 yds of mortar guns, various calibers  
 2500 yds of 81 guns, 2 guns  
 2500 yds of 81 guns (one gun)

3rd Br. (786 effective, theoretically)
 

{	32 custom rifles	}	
	18 mgs		
	4 - 60 mm		guns
	3 - 81 mm		guns

- Naval units made up of personnel belonging to ships out of commission.

1st Country Camp. (2 squadrons, totalling 397 men)

More physical drills could also have been given during the voyage.

17. Adequate Facilities for Marking Beaches Should be Provided. Reefs and dangerous rocks were not marked by the beach parties due to loss of panels and lights in the surf which would indicate that at least two sets of these markers should be included with the shore party equipment.

18. Limitation on Weight for Unloading Over Beaches. Particular attention should be made to limiting the weight of individual packages of cargo which must be unloaded over the beaches. For example: on some ships 105 mm. ammunition which had to be unloaded over the beaches had not been uncased. 360 pounds is too heavy and too bulky to handle; it takes four men. Artillery ammunition should be loaded in two ways; that is, the units of fire which are to be used initially should be uncased and broken down into two-round loads; the remainder which will probably be unloaded at docks should remain cased. It is impractical to uncrate on the ships. All supplies initially to be landed over the beaches should be broken down into one-man loads.

19. Identification of Transports. The great difficulty in small boats of identifying the transports to which they are assigned to take loads on the first waves was discussed in the resume of operations. Perhaps this could be solved by painting on the sides of combat loaders their particular designation with infra-red paint and assigning to each small boat a telescope especially designed to readily pick up the markings.

20. Necessity for Trained Shore Engineers. It is believed that the necessity for trained shore engineers which can get cargo from small boats on to the beaches is vital. It is a fallacy to believe that this work can be efficiently done by combat troops, the troops which can be assembled in any regiment (cooks, mechanics, etc.) over and above those actually in combat should be organized to get supplies from the initial dumps on the beaches (Established by the shore engineers) to the second line of dumps in the beachhead and to the troops.

21. Training for Street Fighting. It is recommended that in future landing operations where ever it is known that towns or cities are involved, the troops should have special training in street fighting.

22. Cleaning of Material Before Loading. It is important that material be thoroughly cleaned and washed before water-proofing and loaded onto transports. Vehicles, tanks, etc., which had been thoroughly cleaned gave better service after debarkation than those which were permitted to be loaded caked with mud.

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24. Self-propelled bunks.

The self-propelled artillery results proved very successful. They were devastating in their fire, were able to get up to forward positions and were the most feared by the French of any equipment we had. The Corporal at Iyautay recommended that a metal net be provided to prevent hand-grenades from being thrown into the gun crew compartment. However, the use of the self-propelled mount in such close action is questionable.

25. Return of key personnel for further instruction with amphibious force.

It is recommended that key personnel who have had experience in the African expedition, particularly in shore fire control parties, air liaison parties, scouts, raiders, shore engineers, etc., be returned to the United States and assigned to units which are still having amphibious training.

26. Use of corduroy and mesh roads.

It is believed that corduroy and mesh material for quickly making a road on sand on the beaches should be given a fairly high priority in the loading.

27. "K" versus "C" rations.

For emergency rations the great majority of troops preferred the "K" to the "C" rations.

28. Training to reach first objective.

It is believed that too much emphasis is placed on platoon and company unit training for amphibious assault forces rather than on boatload training. The boats never arrive on the beaches so that platoons and companies can be assembled immediately after landing. The small combat units should be organized by boatload and under a commander go straight forward to their first objective. After the first line of hills have been captured, there may be time to get platoons and companies together.

29. Organization of French units.

Steps are being taken by General Eisenhower to organize French divisions. Inquiry made in the Medalan-Casablanca area indicates enthusiasm for this plan. Some equipment will have to be furnished. There are approximately 5,000,000 rounds of old 75 mm. ammunition available. With the view of the possible use of high-speed adapters to convert horse drawn 75 mm. carriages, it is requested that the Ordnance Department take preliminary steps to ascertain where these high speed adapters can be obtained.

Toilet Paper

30. It is recommended that toilet paper be issued in small flat packages rather than in rolls in order to more conveniently fit the pocket of the field soldier and also cut down shipping space--the hole in the center of a roll of toilet paper serves no useful purpose.

UNCLASSIFIED 34

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### 30. CPX For Staffs of Amphibious Forces.

The staffs of amphibious forces (including both Army and Navy elements) should be trained thoroughly in a CPX before the operation, especially in methods of communication.

This report was previously written while on the convoy going over, which was mailed to the Commanding General, SOS, on the boat. These Paragraphs are restated herein in order to get all of the report together. (Paragraphs 31 to 45 inclusive.)

#### 31. Pool At Port of Embarkation.

There should be a pool at the port of embarkation consisting of ammunition, medical supplies, vehicles, items of the ration which can be easily handled, clothing and equipment, officers and enlisted men—all of which to be available for last minute loading on transports which have space for any or all of the above items. In the interests of using every bit of our limited shipping, there can be no excuse for other than maximum loads. If one more officer or one more enlisted man or one more case of ammunition or one additional crate of potatoes can still be put aboard, then the ship is not fully loaded. On this particular boat (the "Wm. P. Biddle") there is room for 4 officers, 30 enlisted men and I do not know how much additional rations and ammunition, but it is considerable. Furthermore, there is not enough ammunition available on board to issue all ~~the~~ ~~and~~ ~~during~~ operation; the quartermaster tells me that there is a surplus on board but it is packed in the holds where it cannot be reached. There should be ample ammunition on the docks so that soldiers in the assault waves can be supplied with all the ammunition they can carry.

Because the Supply Division (S-4) of a Task Force is too engrossed in detail usually to get the big picture of the entire transport problem, it is recommended that this pool be directly under the S.O.S. of the War Department. A live officer should be detailed to every ship as liaison, who can keep reporting to the pool the status of these items. The fetish of Adjutant General's and G-1's to get the roster in 48 hours before the boat sails can be overcome by the commander of the pool adding to their lists any last minute additions.

#### 32. Target Practice On Convoys.

Provision should be made for ammunition with which to hold target practice on the way over. The hours could be made more interesting and more profitable if this were so. Thousands of rounds could be stored on the deck temporarily and used for such target practice.

#### 33. Physical Examinations Before Embarkation.

There should be a thorough physical examination in the concentration area of all personnel about a week before leaving for the port of embarkation, in addition to the cursory examination for communicable diseases given at the

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port of embarkation. Such an examination would obviate shipping men over who will probably be ineffective either when they land or shortly thereafter.

34. Transfer of property from Army to Navy at ports of debarkation.

The necessary papers should be prepared prior to sailing to enable the Army to take over all canteen stores and rations on board, except the minimum required to return the transport to the U.S.A.

35. Medical officers.

There should be extra medical officers on board, in addition to the ship's surgeons, to care for wounded going back.

36. Instructions for soldiers on transports.

The operation of troop transports, whether Army or Navy, should be more or less uniform and a standardized order or set of instructions could be given to every soldier before he gets on board covering what must be done on board, such as rules for smoking, police of decks, handling of mess equipment, blackout regulations, ship's signals, rules against throwing fruit skins, etc., overboard, wearing and inflation of life belts, canteen rules, etc. They have an officers' call every day on this boat which goes into all these details which should have been covered thoroughly before the troops got on board and certainly during the first day.

37. Life boat drill.

The first life boat drill should be held before the ships leave the docks. With submarines menacing even the entrances of our ports it is gross negligence to hold the first life boat drill at the end of the second day; they might be sunk before leaving the harbor.

38. Issue of emergency rations.

It is believed that definite steps should be taken to require, on both Army and Navy transports, the issue of emergency rations to each individual on board before leaving the port. As this is written, the transport we are on is within a day of our objective and still no emergency rations have been issued. Upon inquiry I find that they are supposed to be issued in the small boats when we take off to go ashore. However it is believed that emergency rations should be in the possession of each individual at all times. In an emergency (as submarine attack) many people would be on rafts and not in boats and, under present conditions, they would be without emergency rations.

39. Inspection of small arms by number.

In administrative regulations for a boat it is important that the point be made to inspect all small arms in the hands of troops by serial numbers. Cases have occurred on this ship of several soldiers presenting the same firearm (a clean one) for inspection and the officers not finding out until later that the

arms assigned to particular soldiers were in terrible condition from rust and salt air. It is believed that these instructions should go into great detail because after all the great proportion of officers, both Army and Navy, have very little experience and they miss things which more experienced officers would guard against as a matter of course.

#### 40. Discipline.

The entire system of discipline should be tightened up. Each individual should be required not only to have emergency rations and a life belt (which should be issued before leaving port and not a couple of days after) but also a canteen with fresh water, etc. Inspection should be made to see that water is in the canteen, emergency rations are in the possession of the soldier, his arms are in condition, his extra magazines filled, etc., etc., I had the opportunity to travel during this war on an English transport in the Indian Ocean and I am struck forcibly with the contrast of lack of attention to detail on this transport with the attention to such matters in the British Navy.

#### 41. Defective helmets.

There are on board a number of defective helmets with cracks in the metal. The troop commander states that they thought they had culled out all of these defectives. Possibly the manufacturer can be traced down from the place of issue. (These troops were all aboard the Biddle. From this information it may be possible to trace the manufacturer of these defective helmets.)

#### 42. Measurement capacity of holds.

The hatches on these cargo ships are measured in "grain" capacity or "bale" capacity. Both of these units of measure differ from a "combat loaded" capacity. It is recommended that some effort be made to secure the capacity of the various ships under the latter heading, and to make this information available to the ship's officers and transport quartermasters.

#### 43. Covering for gas clothing.

Recommend the issue of some kind of cellulose covering, similar to the one used on new gas masks, for wrapping around impregnated clothing in order to keep the odor and the chemical results away from other clothing. It is difficult to pack impregnated clothing separately when one is limited in baggage.

#### 44. Unused British Ships.

I am told by Captain Gilbrandson, a Commodore of the Navy on this ship, that on his last convoy he went into Bombay and, by actual count, 328 British ships were in that harbor. Many had been there some 4 to 6 weeks awaiting unloading. The same condition existed in Durban. He made a report of this to the Navy Department and it might be well to have the report dug out and see


37-C

that Louis Douglas gets a look at it, because the turn around does not seem so good. Ships do not turn around themselves; someone has to be on the job pushing the skippers because while they are in the port they are still getting their war bonuses without the risks. Captain Gilbrandson also tells me that the Army transport MacAndrew an 18-knot ship going direct from Durban to New York, left Durban empty when she could have taken 7,000 tons of sugar which was available on the dock.

45. Lack of sufficient small arms ammunition.

The small arms ammunition situation on this transport is critical and if the other ships are loaded the way this one (the "William P. Biddle") is, it certainly shows a lack of execution of plans which should be thoroughly investigated with the view to preventing a recurrence on any other combat loaded convoys. While this ship is a "combat loader" it is not combat loaded insofar as small arms ammunition is concerned. I understand that there is ample ammunition in the lower holds but it cannot be made available for issue to the troops; for example there is only 120 rounds per man for sub-machine gun and 80 rounds per 30 caliber rifle. Casuals on the ship have none at all. (It is understood that small arms ammunition is one item we have plenty of). It may take a number of days to unload the cargo on this ship so that they can get the ammunition; in the meantime the quantities listed above are not very much for any continued effort for any great period of time in making a landing on a hostile shore. This is being written the afternoon before we land, so it is hoped the operation will be little, if any; otherwise it might be embarrassing to the troops to be put ashore with so little ammunition. The armored vehicles came on board loaded with 2-1/2 days of fire on all vehicles except mortars which had two units. However the large proportion of troops on board are not with vehicles, such as armored infantry. This emphasizes the point which was made above that the S.O.S. together with a Navy representative should have a liaison man on each ship, who is empowered to draw from a pool rations, ammunition, officers, and enlisted men for the last minute loading of ships. There is no excuse whatever why there should not have been on this ship large quantities of small arms ammunition in boxes on the decks which could be opened and distributed to every soldier and let every soldier carry as much as he thinks he can. The captain of this ship tells me that many cases could have been put under boats and other places and not interfere one bit with the routine of the ship. For landing operations it is suggested that 45 caliber ammunition for submachine guns and pistols be put up in the usual boxes and the boxes contained in bandoliers similar to those used for 30 caliber ammunition. The lack of ammunition is certainly no fault of the planning, because I remember that it was discussed in meetings with General Patton's staff and General Hull, of Operations Division, that extra ammunition would be placed on decks and opened after we put to sea. It might be stated as an excuse that this particular ship was designated to land 3 or 4 hours after the first wave, but even so there are 19 boats leaving this ship on the first wave to be landed at the "Thomas Jefferson" and there will be some soldiers from this ship aboard those boats with 120 rounds of ammunition or less per weapon. Furthermore it can never be definitely stated in a convoy that some ship, which had been designated even as a reserve, might not take part in the assault.

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46. Training of Amphibious Units.

It is believed the War Department should take steps to more closely coordinate the amphibious training in the Army. At the present time the ground forces have an amphibious training command in Florida; and the Atlantic fleet has one under the Navy at Norfolk. Perhaps the ground forces should take charge of the entire training program. It would seem that in an amphibious operation the Navy is a supporting force for the purpose of convoying the troops, assisting in the logistics of the operation and for gun fire support. The Army trains the troops and fights them. Therefore the Task Force Commander should be an Army General rather than a Navy Admiral, except where an amphibious operation is fully naval. It is difficult to understand why Capt. Emmett of the Navy should have been in command of the Central Sub-Task Force rather than Major General Anderson of the Army; for example, if troops are unable to land on a set beach because of fire on that particular beach, it should be the decision of the Army commander as to where, if any place, troops should be landed rather than the decision of the Navy Captain in charge of the transport area. In any event it is "Fruit for thought" in the present situation which is discussed in greater length in Enclosure "C" attached.

47. Medical equipment.

Medical units first going ashore should be equipped with Coleman lanterns to be used in emergency. The medical units on shore at Fedalah did not have anything except Signal Corps flashlights to use for light for operating on casualties from the torpedoed ships on the night of November 12. Finally flood lights from Army ordnance repair units and from the Signal Corps were improvised.

48. Civilian representatives active with fighting forces.

It is recommended that in future operations civilian representatives of all categories be kept to the absolute minimum. For example, there appears to be little use for having a representative of the Bureau of War Information when all correspondents are handled through G-2 of the Army. The Bureau of War Information is a fifth wheel in any Army of occupation.

49. Type of Life Belts.

Please see enclosure "D" attached. This recommendation was made on the way over in the convoy.

50. Issue of gas masks and impregnated clothing.

If the G-2 information shows that there is no possibility of a gas attack, then certainly no gas masks or impregnated clothing should be issued prior to debarkation. In the attack on Africa all soldiers were equipped with gas masks on their person and the impregnated clothing in his barrack bags. The gas mask was found to hamper the soldier in his movements and made added weight. The French officers were surprised to see the American soldier carrying gas masks. It is my personal belief that the Navy gas mask which is much smaller is far superior to the Army gas mask for landing purposes if any gas mask is to be included.

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51. Additional reports previously submitted:

The following additional reports were submitted separately before this one. Copies of the subjects listed below are attached in order that the report might be complete in one file:

<u>Inclosure no.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
E-1	Shipment of cork from Morocco.
E-2	Concrete production in Morocco.
E-3	Laundry facilities in Morocco.
E-4	Coal situation in Morocco.
E-5	Essentials for civilian population in Morocco.
E-6	French ships in Moroccan Ports.
E-7	Training of Railroad Battalions.
E-8	Priorities for civilians on air routes to North Africa.
E-9	German Individual Stove.
E-10	Gasoline stocks in Morocco.
E-11	Condition of Railroads
E-12	Army Postal System
E-13	Strategic Materials available in Morocco.
E-14	Loss of allotment records for officers, SOS, WTF.
E-15	Printed Signs
E-16	Detail of Capt. Edward Ellsberg, U. S. N.
E-17-A	T.U.P. Mobile Assembly Unit.
E-17-B	Photostat showing T.U.P. Mobile Assembly Unit.
E-18-	Manifest.
E-19	Modification of 2-1/2 ton trucks.
E-20	Equipment for airfield construction.
E-21	Propaganda.
E-22	Military police Battalions.
E-23	Cooperation with civilians in Morocco.
E-24	Service Troops on succeeding Convoys.

*Arthur R. Wilson*  
 ARTHUR R. WILSON  
 Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Inclosures as follows:

<u>Description</u>	<u>Page of Report</u>	<u>Inclosure Nos.</u>
Map Photostats	13	A-1 to A-3 incl.
Rocket Gun	22	B
"Joint Force" Organization	38	C
Life Belts	38	D
Previous Reports Submitted	39	E-1 to E-24 incl.

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DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff - (2 copies)


Commanding General, Services of Supply (3 copies)

Bureau of Public Relations (1 copy)

41-6

# LAGEPLAN DER HAUPT-NEBEN-UND STOCKIERUNGSLAGER IN FRANZÖSISCH MAROKKO

MASSTAB 1:2 MILL.




## ZEICHENERKLÄRUNG:

- |   |  |   |                   |
|---|--|---|-------------------|
| — | LANDESGRENZEN                              | — | PROVINZGRENZEN    |
| — | DEUTSCH-ITALIEN-GRENZE                     |   |                   |
| □ | EPSA (HAUPTPARK)                           | ● | ROT-MUNITION      |
| ○ | AMA (NEBENLAGER)                           | ● | BLAU-GERÄT        |
| ○ | EASA (NEBENDPARK)                          | ● | BRAUN-NACHRICHTEN |
| ▽ | DEPÔT SOUS CONTROLE<br>(STOCKIERUNGSLAGER) | ● | SCHWARZ-PIONIERS  |

Süd-  
Marokko (Span.)

VERTEILUNG D. FRANZÖSISCHEN ÜBERGANGSHEERES  
UND DER ZUSÄTZLICH GENEHMIGTEN EINHEITEN  
STAND: 20.10.42



HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2410, Munitions Building  
Washington, D. C.

6 December 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General SOS.

SUBJECT : Rocket Gun.

1. As far as is known, the new rocket gun was used for the first time in our army against the enemy in the fighting in North Africa. It is believed that more use would have been made of it had it been issued earlier and troops given instruction in it so that they would have had confidence in the weapon. As it was, it was not issued until after boarding the ships. On the boat I was assigned, we had instruction during the voyage in its manipulation, but no firing. This procedure is not conducive to establishing confidence in a new weapon or to insuring its best effectiveness. At least a few rounds could have been shot into the water. A number were thrown away by the soldiers at the beaches.

2. However, even with this adverse beginning, considerable use was made of the weapon, especially in the Lyautey sector. It was used very little by the 3rd Division in the Fedala-Casablanca area, but officers to whom I talked stated that they believed it to be a fine weapon. General Truscott stated that his unit used it a great deal. It was particularly effective against tanks and a number of hits were scored. During one period of the attack, it was necessary to get over men into the fight, and among other units, General Truscott organized one of about a dozen sailors under the command of one officer. They reclaimed rocket guns which had been thrown away, gave the detachment a few minutes training, and sent them into the fight with great effectiveness. Colonel De Rown, commanding the 60th Infantry, stated that one of his Lieutenants with a couple of assistants used a rocket gun in the fighting at Meledia with great effectiveness at Fort Kasba. This small detachment practically captured one part of the fort, killing and wounding a large number of French soldiers at short range with the rocket gun.

ARTHUR R. WILSON,  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

44-1

- personnel, to learn each other's tactics).
- (g) Amphibious Scout School (under an Army officer).
  - (h) Amphibious Raider School (under an Army officer).
  - (i) Boat-Wave Commanders School (although for naval officers, this school was established and operated by Army officers).
  - (j) Communications School (under a Naval officer).
  - (k) Amphibious Replacement Training Center (has not yet been established, but will be needed; would be an Army establishment).

This organization has been built up largely by Army officers. The Army part appear to function well. However, some Army officers on the staff feel they could do even better were it not for the fact that the Navy feels some of the operations are properly its own peculiar functions. For instance, the Army personnel believes it could, with volunteer soldiers who like life on the water, develop better boats' crews than the Navy can. The Navy does not agree. It is certain that many of the boat crews in the North African operation could have been far better trained. With a calm sea, it seems incredible that boats should have been landed at places so far distant from their beaches.


It is the belief of the Army officers on duty with the amphibious forces that the staff is not properly used, primarily because the Navy is not grounded or taught staff procedure. It is obvious that if the Navy is to work jointly with Army units and work with Army staffs, there must be some semblance of similar staff procedure on the part of the Navy. The Army officers state that there is too much centralization that deprives the Staff of discretion with consequent failure to seek Staff advice. The following examples were cited:

At FEDAIA in WEST AFRICA two French destroyers came out from CASABLANCA and shot up the right flank of the 7th Infantry. Commander Air Group (plane carriers) had reported that his bombing attacks had made seven direct hits and two near misses on the French battleship JEAN BART in CASABLANCA, and that she was gutted by fire. Without reference to G-2-N-2 as to confirmation, the flagship, AUGUSTA, was run in to fight the destroyers and was nearly hit by the 15-inch guns of the JEAN BART, which would easily have sunk the cruiser AUGUSTA. Out of ten 2-gun salvos, seven were bracketting for range, one salvo hit within 100 feet of one side of the Augusta, one salvo within a hundred feet of the other side while the tenth salvo was several hundred yards short.

About the same time the 3rd Infantry Division called for naval air support. G-3 and N-3 prepared a routine despatch to Commander Air Group, but G-3 could not release it himself and could not get it released from the flag bridge for an hour.

There is no question but what the officers on the staff of the amphibious forces feel that they don't have the prestige and influence with the naval staff which they should.

The Transport Group is a very important part of the force, because it carries troops overseas and launches them ashore in landing



craft. However, it is apparent that many of the senior officers are not of the same caliber as the corresponding grades on men of war. The Junior Officers are not as well trained on the whole as are the junior officers in the Army, with the result that they cannot take command of small ships and shore installations in the same manner that an Army officer of the same grade would take command. There are too many naval officers apparently who have been commissioned directly from civilian life and put on transports with very little training. Our Navy has considered the amphibious forces as a "Bush-league" team. Then suddenly they had to take this team into Class AA competition. Had the West African War been "Big League" stuff, the result would have been disaster. The poor functioning of transports delayed H-hour and caused boats crews to land troops in the wrong places. Some of the results would have been ludicrous if not so tragic. It is realized that boats crews had to be very hastily trained in large numbers.

The Force Headquarters Section (Army), already mentioned, is commanded by the Senior Officer, who is also Chief of the Army Section of the Force Staff. This Force Headquarters Section now includes (a) the Army Staff, with its headquarters clerks, etc., (b) the Headquarters and Military Police Company, (c) the car platoon, (d) the Army Overhead of the Training Center, and (e) a Port Liaison Detachment.

It is believed that the force needs a highly-trained small establishment of assault troops to lead the attack on beaches and to reduce strong coastal defenses. These troops should be part of the Force Headquarters Section (Army). The Shore-Party Engineers who handle supplies over the beach should also be part of this section. They also require special training, and should be a permanent part of the Amphibious force. Unless highly trained specialized troops are available to lead the attack and to get supplies in to dumps ashore, or heavy infantry will fall or suffer great loss in attacking well-defended coast lines. Our divisional infantry is too heavy for this work, and is not amphibious enough. Primarily intended for campaigns ashore, our divisions can never be specialized for landing attacks without affecting their value for land campaigns. Special troops are required for landing assaults and for pushing supplies inland.

The Army Establishment of the Amphibious Force is the true amphibious part of it, because the personnel operates both on land and water. With a few exceptions, the Naval personnel operates only on the water. The exceptions are the small Naval Beach Parties, Shore Fire-Control Parties, Air Liaison Parties, and other miscellaneous detachments.

The functions of the Naval Complement of the Force are to transport troops safely overseas, put them on the beach, and to give them air, gunfire, and logistics support.

The force has to depend on its specialized Army personnel to train the Army troops assigned for training, and to give specialized help to the Naval Staff and to Army Task Force Staffs in planning and supervision of operations. To do this work effectively, the Army Staff of the Amphibious Force should have great weight and influence. Rank means a great deal in the Navy. The Chief of the Amphibious Army Staff should be a General Officer, because he has to deal constantly with



Flag Officers and with General Officers. This is very important to the war effort of the Amphibious Force and to that of the Nation if the Amphibian Force is to continue to play the part it played in WEST AFRICA.

If the Navy will not take steps to vitalize the Amphibious Force, it is believed that the Army must take effective steps in its own interest and that of the war effort. Otherwise our troops will continue to be unnecessarily drowned in landing craft, smashed on rocks, landed at the wrong places and killed, wounded, or captured there, and even shot up by their own naval gunfire support. There is also the matter of our soldiers wounded, burned, or drowned in torpedoed transports anchored at sea instead of safely moored in available harbor space.

There is a definite way to improve amphibious training and to unify the efforts of the Army and Navy in this respect. Such unification will serve to bring pressure on the Navy to correct its serious defects.

The Army has now, under the Army Ground Forces, an organization called the "Army Amphibious Training Command". As at present set up, this is a sort of "Fifth wheel". If the Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, did its work well, there would be nothing for the Army Amphibious Training Command to do. The whole situation can be much improved, under present circumstances, by setting up the two agencies side by side and by fusing them partly together. In this way they could merge their resources in personnel and facilities. At the same time, the Army Amphibious Training Command could maintain a separate existence and could materially influence the Amphibious Force to improve its naval performance.

Although the Army has the main part of the amphibious forces, the Navy being merely a means of transport, the Chief of Staff of the naval section amphibious forces is a Rear Admiral, while the Chief of Staff of the Army part of the force is a Colonel. If the Commanding General, Army Amphibious Training Command, should be assigned, in addition to his other duties, as Chief of Staff, Army Section, Amphibious Force, he would automatically become senior officer of the Force Headquarters Section (Army). By virtue of these powers he could then, with the concurrence of Commander, Amphibious Force, merge the Amphibious Force Training Center into the Army Amphibious Training Command, and could abolish duplication of function.

In his threefold capacity, the Commanding General, Army Amphibious Training Command should have the assistance of a Brigadier General as Deputy Chief of Staff, Army Section, Amphibious Force, and another as Commander, Training Center. These positions are now filled by Colonels.

The Headquarters of the Army Amphibious Training command should be at or near the Administrative Command, Amphibious Force at OCEAN VIEW, VIRGINIA.

The Training Center Headquarters should be at the present new location of the Army Amphibious Training Command at CARABELLE, FLORIDA. The Amphibious Force is already planning to set up a Training Base near there. Some Training Center activities would remain in the CHESAPEAKE area, but it would be a great advantage to concentrate the principal

47-0

training of specialized troops in FLORIDA. It is believed that better discipline and training for the whole force can be established on an Army than on a naval reservation.

Details can easily be worked out. The big feature is that the Army would become so strong in the Amphibious Force that the Navy would be forced to listen and to learn and to take positive action to correct its defects.

The Navy may object to this proposal, but if the highly-specialized amphibious Army officers of the Amphibious Force are given proper positions in the new set-up (or are relieved if they wish to be relieved), there will be so much influence in favor of the change that the Navy will probably accept it without much opposition.

The change can be accomplished without a new joint agreement. All that is necessary is to get the Navy to consent to the assignment of an officer as Chief of the Army Section, Staff Commander Amphibious Force, who also holds assignment as Commanding General, Army Amphibious Command. Then all Army personnel of the Headquarters Section (Army), Amphibious Force should be transferred to the Army Amphibious Training Command, and authority conferred on the Commanding General of the latter to attach personnel to the Amphibious Force and to make transfers at will. After that, with a little tact and management, everything else will follow.



H8-C ✓

October 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDING GENERAL, S. O. S.

SUBJECT: Life Belts.

1. It is recommended that steps be taken to do away with rubber or any other type of life belt which depends on air inflation on all ships which are in convoy; and that kapok or cork belts be used entirely.
2. The only advantage of the rubber belt is the small space required to carry it, which is desirable on aeroplanes. However, this weight or space is immaterial on shipboard.
3. The inflation type of belt has the obvious disadvantages:
  - a. Playful soldiers stick pins in the belts and render them useless.
  - b. The hazards of bomb fragmentation or other combat causes will easily render them useless.
  - c. They depend on small CO<sub>2</sub> cartridges for inflation, which should not be blown until after the person is in the water. This maneuver after abandoning ship may prove to be more complicated than is indicated by the mere explanation of how the inflation is to be accomplished. What is needed is a foolproof and simple life belt.
4. Aside from the simple design of the kapok belt, it has the advantage of acting as a windbreak in cold weather.

ARTHUR R. WILSON

Brigadier General, U.S.A.

49703 ✓

UNCLASSIFIED

November 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

SUBJECT: Shipment of cork from Morocco.

1. There are large quantities of cork in bales on the docks at Casablanca and Fedala. I am informed that the cork from Casablanca had previously been shipped to the United States and that the cork at Fedala has all been shipped to Marseilles, France.

2. I left a request with the naval officer in charge of the convoy and directions with the Army officer in charge of the forts to load this cork, if possible, on the first available ship and consign it to the Board of Economic Warfare.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brig. General

[REDACTED]

50-6

November 27, 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

Subject: French ships in Moroccan ports.

1. There are a number of French ships of considerable tonnage in Moroccan ports and three which were beached north of Fedalah (these were transporting refugees from Dakar to Marseilles), during the naval engagement. All of these ships should be secured for the United States Shipping Board under agreement with the French authorities, and for return to the United States or for use in coastwise shipping. When reporting to allied headquarters, I was informed that the United States Shipping Board had sent a representative to Africa who was at the moment in Algiers. However, I left directions with a member of my staff to make preliminary inquiries from the owners as to the possibility of chartering these ships.

2. Action recommended: That if it has not already been done, a representative of the War Shipping Administration be stationed in Casablanca to handle such matters and also as liaison with the SOS headquarters for all matters pertaining to United States Shipping.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General



57-0

November 30, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LUTES, OPERATIONS DIVISION, SOS:

Subject: Training of railroad battalions.

It is recommended that railroad battalions be set up and earmarked for training for possible use in North Africa. While at the present time it is planned to use the French and Moroccan-Algerian personnel for operating, this plan may not work out; so in order to have something in reserve it is urgently requested that railway operating units be organized at this time and set up in the 1943 troop basis. If it works out that they are not needed in Morocco then perhaps some other sector may need them and if they are needed no place then they can be disbanded and put into other units.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA

57-✓



December 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

Subject: Priorities for civilians on air routes to North Africa.

1. It is believed that if the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Lend Lease Administration and all other civilian agencies who desire to send people to North Africa to assist in the supply problems of that area are given priority in air travel over essential officers of the Army it will work to the detriment of the war effort.
2. I am certain that in the Moroccan area we do not need a horde of representatives of civilian agencies to make "surveys" at the present time. In the last few days I have talked to representatives of all of these agencies and it is believed that much of their planning is premature. It will be a good idea to have one liaison man probably in each base headquarters - but no more. There is nothing that these agencies can do that cannot be done by Army personnel already there or enroute. For example, the head of my purchasing board was formally with the Board of Economic Warfare; he knows more about North Africa than anybody else the Board of Economic Warfare can send. In any event shipping will dictate what can be sent and when we are trying our best to get supplies for the Army it is believed that this is not the proper time to consider Lend Lease supplies unless such supplies are asked for by the Army. A suitable scheme was worked out in Australia and the same can be applied in Africa.
3. Action recommended.

That the Commanding General, SOS, take action to insure that priorities for essential staff officers and the services of supply for air travel be placed ahead of any Lend Lease, Board of Economic Warfare or any other civilian agency; and that these civilian agencies be encouraged to use convoys rather than air for their travel.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA

HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2405 Munitions Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.


December 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General  
Service of Supply  
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT : German Individual Stove

1. Attached hereto is an individual stove which is issued to German soldiers and which burns a compressed fuel. It is believed that this stove may be interesting to the Quartermaster Corps in the development of a similar stove for our Army. This stove is only about the size of a pack of cards and is of little weight. It could be issued to individual soldiers and the necessary fuel included in the ration.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding





December 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

Subject: Army Postal System

There seems to be some difficulty with the mail addressed to A.P.O. 759 because mail addressed to that APO number for persons who are now known to be in North Africa is being returned to the senders by the Post Office in New York as incorrectly addressed or is being held at Fort Meade or the port of embarkation. I was told at the port of embarkation that the War Department has not yet moved that post office or the one designated for Headquarters, WTF, because the entire contingent has not yet left the port of embarkation; and that this was being done for reasons of secrecy.

Where part of a unit is in Africa and part in the United States it would seem that mail for people now in Africa should be forwarded and not held in the United States.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA

HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2405 Munitions Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

December 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General  
Service of Supply  
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Strategic Materials Available in Morocco

1. Before leaving Casablanca I had an opportunity to have a conference with the Chief of the Department of the Interior of Morocco at which he outlined the possibilities of securing certain strategic materials from that country which might be shipped back in empty ships to the United States. Following are some of the minerals now available:

Magnesium, rich	50,000 tons now mined. Can mine 6,000 to 10,000 tons per month.
Note:	The magnesium mines must have diesel oil with which to operate their equipment.
Bauxite ore	2,000 tons now mined. Production: 500 tons per month.
Cobalt	4,000 tons now mined.
Lead	25,000 tons now mined. Can mine about 2,000 tons per month.
Iron ore (48%)	120,000 tons now mined. Production: 25,000 tons per month.
Iron ore (50%)	18,000 tons now mined. Production: 30,000 tons per month.
Wolfram ore	35 tons now mined. A very small production per month.

2. Molybdenum ore is produced in small quantities but he was unable to give me production figures.

3. There is a considerable quantity of phosphates mined and separate docks for both phosphate and bulk minerals are equipped to handle ore shipment. There is a number of tanks now on the docks.

4. I received a list of the various strategic minerals in Morocco and the various mines and the various companies which are producing them. The list is being forwarded to the Board of Economic Warfare.

56-6

HEADQUARTERS 808 WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2405 Munitions Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

December 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General  
Service of Supply  
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT : Gasoline stocks in Morocco

1. The following amounts of gasoline were in the tanks at Fedalah:

2,500 liters pure ethyl.  
500,000 liters aviation gasoline.  
800 liters low octane.

2. On November 1st the entire stock of motor vehicle fuel in Morocco was as follows:

Gasoline: 530 cubic meters  
Alcohol: 900 cubic meters  
There was no Diesel oil.

3. The consumption in Morocco before the war was about 11,000 cubic meters of gasoline per month and 565 tons of lubricating oil.

4. The above figures were obtained from the head of the Department of Interior in Morocco.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
Service of Supply  
Washington, D. C.**

December 2, 1944

**MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General  
Service of Supply  
Washington, D. C.**

**SUBJECT: Condition of Railroads**

1. The G-2 report on the railroads in Morocco is almost exact. They have 90 steam engines, 55 electric engines, 6,000 flat cars (from 12 to 40 ton capacity), 150 passenger cars, and 50 tank cars. It was reported that the grates in the steam locomotives were worn out but this is incorrect. The Chief Engineer states that the grates are O.K.

2. About 20 engines should be shipped as soon as practicable.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED  
58-6

UNCLASSIFIED

December 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS.

SUBJECT: Loss of allotment records for officers, SOS, WFF.

I have been informed that approximately 50 allotments for dependents made by officers of the SOS, WFF, in the port of embarkation have been lost by the Newark, New Jersey, allotment Office. At least an investigation made by my finance officer shows that no record whatever of a large number of allotments can be found in that headquarters.

The finance officer of the SOS, WFF, made a personal check to ascertain if allotments for wives or dependents made by officers about to embark overseas were actually of record. A large number were not and therefore duplicate allotments were made. These facts are furnished for your information because had it not been for the personal initiative of the finance officer these officers would not have known that no allotments were of record.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

UNCLASSIFIED

59-C

Inclosure B

Inclosure E-3

November 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

Subject: Laundry facilities in Morocco.

1. A preliminary investigation indicates that there will be ample laundry facilities in Morocco for the United States Army. All they need is the necessary soap and cleaning materials.

2. Action recommended: That the Quartermaster General make estimates and provide for the shipment of the necessary maintenance supplies for laundries, for the number of troops to be stationed in Morocco.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brig. General

November 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

Subject: Coal situation in Morocco

1. A The necessity for the shipment of from 15 to 20,000 tons of bituminous coal a month to Morocco is vital, not only for the military situation, but for civilian needs. The Army must have coal for running the railroads, light, power, cement factories, and other utilities which are needed not only for use of the civil population but also for the military. The initial shipment should be made on the first possible convoy. There was only about 6,000 tons of coal in Casablanca on November 20, 1942, and I am told that represents almost the complete supply in Morocco. It is probable that 10,000 tons (or about a 3 weeks supply) would represent all of the coal in Morocco at that time.

B It is estimated that Algeria needs 60 to 70,000 tons a month.

C These estimates were secured from the head of the Department of Commerce in Morocco and concurred in by the chief engineer of the railroad.

2. All coal mined in Morocco and Algeria is anthracite which must be mixed with bituminous. Heretofore, shipments from France have been from 50 to 60,000 tons a month. The mine at Djerada produces about 10,000 tons a month and the mine at Khenadza (in Algeria) produces about 12,000 tons a month. This is not sufficient for the consumption of the railroads and necessary utilities east of Oran.

3. There is a special coal wharf with facilities for unloading at Casablanca in good condition. Information was obtained that there is also a coal wharf at Oran (whether or not it was damaged is not known).

4. Perhaps the production of coal from the native mines can be increased by the adoption of more efficient mining methods. I have an engineer and mine management experts on my staff who will be immediately detailed to survey the situation when they arrive in Morocco, with a view to increasing production by the inauguration of more efficient methods of operation.

5. Action recommended: That initially, 15,000 tons of coal per month be scheduled for shipment to Casablanca to commence with the first possible convoy.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General

**November 27, 1942**

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:**

**Subject: Essentials for civilian population in Morocco.**

1. The essentials for the civilian population in Morocco have been checked to be those previously reported. They are: coal, gasoline, cotton goods (cheap grade), sugar, tea, kerosene, candles and soap.

2. The coal situation is covered in a separate memorandum.

**ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA**



November 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:

Subject: Concrete production in Morocco

1. There is one large concrete plant in Morocco located in Casablanca. It is capable of manufacturing about 16,000 tons of cement a month. It is closed at the present time for lack of coal.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

HEADQUARTERS SOS APO 759  
Room 2405 - Munitions  
Bldg.  
Washington, D.C.

December 11, 1942

**MEMORANDUM TO :** Commanding General, SOS

**SUBJECT :** T. U. P. Mobile Assembly Unit

1. Experience has shown that when motor vehicles are shipped "knocked-down" in twin-unit packs there results a saving of 40 to 65 per cent in cargo space. However, when vehicles are shipped in this manner, there must be at the receiving end suitable equipment and trained personnel to quickly handle the packs and assemble the contents. With these facts in mind, and also probable facilities in North Africa, I conferred with officials of the General Motors Corporation during the initial step of organizing the SOS, WTF. The general idea of the equipment desired was given and following a number of conferences with these experts and Colonel John W. Coffey, Ord. Dept., an organization and equipment are now available.

2. The equipment consists of two completely independent mobile units capable of moving at 30 miles per hour to any port in the theatre. Each unit can assemble 50 vehicles per each 10 hours of operation with trained personnel. It is planned to operate 20 hours a day with 4 hours left for overtime and maintenance. This will give a daily capacity of 200 vehicles. This equipment is now at the Belle Mead Q. M. Depot, Boundbrook, N. J., ready for shipment overseas. An effort was made to ship part of the equipment on the UGS-3 convoy but no space was available.

3. The organization is the 2nd Bn., 302nd Ordnance Base Regiment, which has been trained during the past month at Camp Pickett, Va.

4. It is understood that shipment of vehicles T.U.P. will start with the UDS-4 convoy. It is therefore considered essential that the assembly unit equipment and the remainder of the 2nd Bn., 302nd Ordnance Base Regiment be forwarded on the UGS-4 and UGF -4 convoys.

5. Attached is a manual giving a general description of the T.U.P. Mobile Assembly Unit, its equipment, possible layout, and operating procedure. It is believed that this pioneer effort in organizing a mobile assembly plant for motor vehicles has been timely and will meet an urgent requirement of the new theatre. Similar units might well be organized for possible use in other theatres. Complete report will be made as soon as this plant has been put in operation overseas.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

December 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER GENERAL, SOS:

SUBJECT: Printed Signs.

Request that the following signs printed in suitable size for posting, in company with the following, be sent to Headquarters, SOS, WFF:

1. WHEN AN ENEMY SOLDIER IS AN ASSASSIN OF GOOD WILL;  
BE CAREFUL OF YOUR PROPERTY.
2. ENEMIES ARE NOT ASSASSINATED; DON'T WASTE FOOD.
3. Copy of the poster previously printed showing General George Washington's orders and admonition against the same.

ARTHUR C. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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5

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December 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SOS:


SUBJECT: Detail of Captain Edward Ellsberg, U.S.N.

It is recommended that Captain Edward Ellsberg, who is probably the outstanding salvage expert in the Navy, be detailed to the Naval Headquarters at Casablanca to assist in the salvage of sunken ships and clearing of the harbor which is so important. It is understood that Captain Ellsberg is at present in the middle east and is just finishing a salvage job in that area.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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66

[REDACTED]



PANORAMA  
of  
U.S. ARMY  
TUP MOBILE  
ASSEMBLY UNIT

69.6

**UNCLASSIFIED**

December 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLIES

SUBJECT: Manifest.

It is requested as soon as convoys leave the port of embarkation enroute to the Atlantic Base Sector copies of manifest be air mailed to that sector. This will give the Special Services a break down of the cargo on the convoy before it arrives and will enable them to plan accordingly for the handling of the cargo.

ARTHUR R. NELSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

66-10  
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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

November 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, COS:

SUBJECT: Modification of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck .

1. It is recommended that modification be made on the 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck to make the cab demountable and provide it with bucket seats for amphibious operations. The value of a cab for any tactical operation is questionable. The present mount for the machine gun could be taken off as far as amphibious operations are concerned and some kind of a bracket mount designed to attach afterwards. The brackets should be added on the sides of the truck body to lash ropes.

2. The trucks can be loaded packed with supplies, the top used as a tarpaulin and roped to cover the supplies, and the bows detached and placed on top of the load.

3. Many holds in ships have only a seven foot clearance. The height of a 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck, with hood, is 9 $\frac{1}{2}$  feet. Obviously if the modifications suggested above are put into effect many more 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks can be loaded on a ship.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ 69-6

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2405 Munitions Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

December 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, Service of Supply

SUBJECT : Equipment for airfield construction

It is believed that in general the engineer equipment for airfield construction being shipped to Africa is too light. The same type of heavy equipment which is used for construction of airfields in the United States should be used in Africa. It is, therefore, recommended that as soon as shipping conditions permit the heaviest type of equipment be sent.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA

170-6





~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
2405 Munitions Building  
Washington, D. C.

December 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Public Relations

SUBJECT : Propaganda

1. The value of the press in Morocco (as in any state) in order to build up a friendly spirit for the United States and its Army is great. In order to take full advantage, it is believed that a great number of pictures of the prominent officials in the United States Government and in particular those connected with the Army and Navy should be furnished. Due to the shortage in necessary materials the type of photograph, which can be reproduced in the Moroccan newspapers is not of the best. The following suggestions are therefore made.

(a) That cuts or mats on the size of screen best suited for the Moroccan newspapers be made up by the Bureau of Public Relations and shipped airmail to the Commanding General, Atlantic Base, for distribution to the newspapers. (I am not familiar with the technical processes involved.)

(b) In addition to these cuts or mats, photographs (different from those made up in cuts or mats) should be provided for distribution.

(c) The following subjects are suggested:

The President of the United States  
The Vice-President of the United States  
The Secretary of War  
The Assistant Secretaries of War  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Chief of Staff  
The Deputy Chief of Staff  
All the G's of the War Department  
General Eisenhower  
General Eisenhower's principal staff officers  
Lt. General Clark  
General Patton  
General Patton's principal staff officers  
General McNair  
General Somervell  
General Arnold  
General Devers  
General Lutz, Chief of Operations, SOS  
General Styre, Chief of Staff, SOS  
Admiral King  
Vice Admiral James Hall, Commander of the African  
Naval District  
Captain Sickles, Commander of the Port at Casablanca  
And any other officials that render themselves to  
publicity and propaganda.

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Enclosure 1-21

2. Some kind of story about these people, which can be pointed to suit local conditions, should be included.

3. In addition it is recommended that regularly prepared releases depicting the United States war effort, particularly its industrial mobilization, should be included.

4. If these thoughts are concurred in, I will have a member of my staff prepare articles on agriculture, fruit growing, stock raising, and any other line of endeavor which fits in with the Moroccan economy. These articles can be returned to the Bureau of Public Relations who in turn should submit them to the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Mines, etc., etc., then return to the Atlantic Base for translation into French or Arabic for publication.

5. It is believed that a great deal along this line can be accomplished.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

11/10/11 10:00 AM

HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2405 Munitions Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

December 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Operations Division (Att: Col. Connor)


SUBJECT: Military Police Battalions

1. When the combat troops move out of the Casablanca base, it is believed that a good military police battalion, or another battalion equally trained, would probably replace all combat troops. It will be easier for the Eastern Defense Command to train a new battalion in the United States than it will be to train such a battalion in the European theater.

2. It is recommended that the 518th Military Police Battalion be secured with a high movement priority. This battalion is now assigned to the Eastern Defense Command doing routine police duty at railroad stations, on trains and at local installations. By reason of their training and past experience this battalion is believed to be of greater value as a field unit. Its personnel is understood to include only those fit for field duty and could be replaced by a unit of limited service personnel. The unit has had field experience gained through three maneuvers. It is equipped with special clothing and equipment and would set a high standard in appearance. The unit is trained for such work as we have for it and not for what it is presently doing. The Provost Marshal General's office concurs in this opinion.

3. One company (Company C) 101st Military Police Battalion is understood to be at the port of embarkation for movement overseas on D/65. One company is scheduled for D/90. Battalion headquarters and the balance of the battalion (Hq. Co. and one line company) is scheduled for D/115. Arrangements have been made to build up these units to full strength with trained personnel.

ARTHUR R. WILSON,  
Brigadier General, USA,  
Commanding.

13-6  


HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2410 Munitions Bldg.  
Washington, D. C.

December 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, Services of Supply

SUBJECT: Cooperation With Civilians in Morocco

It appears that the following steps are desirable as a means of cooperation with civilians in Morocco. For your information I have discussed these matters with Mr. Appelby of the State Department who has been designated to coordinate such efforts. As soon as I return to the European Theatre a conference will be held with General Eisenhower's staff.

a. There must be strict coordination between the Army and the various civilian agencies which are apparently all eager to assist in the war effort, such as Lend Lease, Board of Economic Warfare, State Department, etc. After all we are still at war in Africa and the decision on all of these matters should rest with the Army. The desired level of supply must be weighed against the desirability of amplifying the food for the civilian population.

b. Supplies for civilians such as notions, cotton cloth, candles, soap, kerosene, sugar, tea, and various other trade goods will be shipped into Morocco by civilian agencies. Care must be taken that these stocks are not so distributed that it will adversely effect the attitude and willingness of the natives who work for the Army. Apparently they are "all on WPA".

c. What merchant, what wholesaler, what retailer, are to be used by the civilian agencies? Who is going to control the prices? Who is going to handle the funds for the goods? A great number of similar questions come to mind.

d. A quantity of CCC clothes has been secured for issue to natives who work for the Army on a bonus system. It will be recommended that the great bulk of any civilian cargo sent in be used in a similar manner, in order to give them increased incentive to work for the United States Government. Cards have been printed to issue to workers on which a record of the number of days he worked can be entered and at stated intervals he will be awarded bonuses commensurate with the amount and quality of his work.

e. Materials such as cork will be shipped back to the United States.

f. A survey will be made to indicate what steps are necessary to increase products of food stuffs which can be raised for our forces in order to cut down shipping.

g. The purchasing board set up for the Atlantic Base Section headed by Colonel Wickersham includes a number of officers well qualified to control these surveys. Until such time as civilian agencies are prepared to take over all of this work it is believed that the survey can be made with the officer personnel which will be available in Africa.

ARTHUR R. WILSON,  
Brigadier General, USA,  
Commanding.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

HEADQUARTERS SOS WESTERN TASK FORCE  
Room 2405, Munitions Bldg.,  
Washington, D. C.

December 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Operations Division (Att: Colonel Connor)

SUBJECT : Service Troops on Succeeding Convoys

1. Please be sure to see that service units come over with reduced strength in accordance with the previous letter written on that subject. The reduced tables of organization were given to your office by Colonel Tate. In addition to the strength reduced on those tables, please make an additional horizontal reduction of 10% to all enlisted strength and eliminate at least one officer from every service unit on the present tables of organization.

2. The following service units should go over as soon as possible. The service units are listed on the attached sheet.

ARTHUR R. WILSON  
Brigadier General, USA,  
Commanding.

1 Encl.

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74-C

Quartermaster Troops Required  
On D/65 or Succeeding Convoys

	<u>Total</u> <u>Required</u>	<u>Now in</u> <u>Theatre or</u> <u>D/4</u>	<u>Setup</u> <u>for D/65</u>	<u>Additional</u> <u>Required</u> <u>D/65</u>
QM Salvage Repair Company T/O 10-257 (50) Repair for 50,000 (Shoes, cloth- ing, tents, etc.)	1	0	0	1
QM Sales Company T/O 10-157 (25) Sell to 120,000 (Mobile)	1	0	0	1
QM Sterilization Company (Equipment Necessary) T/O 10-177 (5) Bathe and sterilize 2,500 per day	1	0	0	1
QM Salvage Collecting Company T/O 187 (0) Collect salvage for 75,000	1	0	0	1
QM Graves Registration Company T/O 10-297 (5) 1 required for each 3 divisions	1	0	0	1

Aggregate Strength: 85

Note: The figures in parenthesis are the reduced strength.  
The column total required is based on the usual percentages.  
The Salvage Collecting Company should consist of about one officer  
and five non-commissioned officers with some experience in salvage  
and repair only. All of the officers and men for this unit will  
be recruited from troops now in the theatre or enroute thereto.  
The Graves Registration Company should be a detachment of about 5  
non-commissioned officers.

77-0